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LEGISLATURES, JUDGES, AND PAROLE BOARDS: THE 
ALLOCATION OF DISCRETION UNDER DETERMINATE 
SENTENCING 
Dhammika Dharmapala,* Nuno Garoupa,** and Joanna M. Shepherd*** 
Abstract 
The most significant development in criminal sentencing in recent 
decades has been the shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing. 
Yet no study has systematically explored the factors leading to this shift. In 
this Article, we provide the first analysis to explain why state legislatures 
enact reforms that significantly reduce both judges’ and parole boards’ 
discretion over criminal sentencing. First, we develop a political economy 
model that explains why legislatures acting in their own self-interest may 
be motivated to enact these laws. Our model predicts that legislatures are 
more likely to enact determinate sentencing reforms when there is tension 
among the political ideologies of legislatures, judges, and parole boards. 
Then, we empirically test the predictions of our political economy model 
using data from all fifty states over the period from 1960 to 2000. Our 
analyses confirm that political variables, such as divided government, are 
the primary influences on legislatures’ decisions to enact determinate 
sentencing reforms. These results are consistent with our model’s 
hypothesis: long histories of divided government produce clashes among 
the sentencing goals of legislatures, parole boards, and judges, and 
legislatures respond by enacting reforms that take power away from the 
judges and parole boards. Our conclusions are especially important given 
recent court cases and criticisms that challenge the future of determinate 
sentencing reforms. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Criminal sentencing in the United States has undergone sweeping 
changes in recent decades. The most significant development in sentencing 
has been the reallocation of power away from judges and parole boards and 
towards legislatures. State legislatures have accomplished this reallocation 
of power by enacting determinate sentencing legislation, such as 
sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing laws, and the abolition of 
discretionary parole. Despite these dramatic changes in criminal 
sentencing, no study has systematically explored the factors leading to this 
shift. In this Article, we provide the first analysis to explain why state 
legislatures enact reforms that significantly reduce both judges’ and parole 
boards’ discretion over criminal sentencing.  
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Explaining the factors that influence legislatures to enact determinate 
sentencing reforms is especially important given recent developments in 
determinate sentencing. Decisions in several recent cases threaten the 
future of state sentencing guidelines and may presage further significant 
changes in criminal sentencing in the near future. For example, in its 
landmark Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker decisions, the 
Supreme Court found both state and federal sentencing guidelines to be 
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment.1 Although Blakely and 
Booker found unconstitutional only provisions of the Washington state and 
federal sentencing systems, scholars agree that the decisions threaten the 
sentencing systems of many other states.2 For example, in her Blakely 
dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor identified nine other states whose 
sentencing regimes may also be unconstitutional under Blakely.3 Others 
have concluded that all but the District of Columbia and three of the 
twenty-four states with sentencing guidelines or similar sentencing systems 
are threatened.4 
Similarly, constraints on parole boards have recently come under attack 
as states target prison overcrowding and rising correctional expenditures. 
In at least twenty-three states, correctional institutions experienced 
overcrowding, with constraints on parole ranking moderately high as a 
cause among correction officials.5 In 2010, the Supreme Court delayed a 
final ruling, on jurisdictional grounds, on a recent court order requiring the 
California prison system to house 40,000 fewer prison inmates;6 
                                                                                                                     
 1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296, 305 (2004). The Court set the stage for Blakely and Booker in three earlier decisions. In Jones 
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999), the Court found that a federal carjacking statute could 
be unconstitutional if it allowed judges to determine the existence of sentencing factors that would 
increase a defendant’s sentence. Likewise, in 2000, the Court ruled in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 476 (2000), that racial bias must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a 
judge could impose an enhanced hate crime sentence. Two years later, in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584, 588–89 (2002), the Court extended this reasoning to capital cases by requiring a jury to rule on 
aggravating factors that could result in a penalty of death. In the 2004 Blakely decision, the Court 
expanded these rulings to include sentencing guidelines. In the 2005 Booker decision, the Court 
confirmed Blakely’s far-reaching impact by ruling that, like the Washington sentencing guidelines 
held unconstitutional in Blakely, sections of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were 
constitutionally flawed.  
 2. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1049 
(2005); Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-
Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1086–87 (2005); Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated 
Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington: Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 60, 60 (2004); Katie M. McVoy, Note, “What I Have Feared Most Has Now Come To 
Pass”: Blakely, Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613, 1613 (2005). 
 3. 542 U.S. at 323 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 4. For a discussion, see Wool & Stemen, supra note 2, at 62. 
 5. Fred Holbert & Jack E. Call, The Perspective of State Correctional Officials on Prison 
Overcrowding: Causes, Court Orders, and Solutions, 53 FED. PROBATION 25, 26–27 tbls.1, 2 & 3 
(1989). 
 6. Michael Rothfeld, U.S. Supreme Court Delays Final Ruling on California Prison Case, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-
politics/2010/01/supreme-court-to-weigh-in-on-california-prison-case.html. 
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constraints on discretionary parole are blamed as a primary cause for this 
prison crisis in California.7  
Thus, as states consider reforming their determinate sentencing 
practices, it is particularly important to understand the factors that 
influence legislatures to enact these reforms. An understanding of the 
original motivations for these practices can provide guidance on the 
directions that future reforms may take in response to the recent Supreme 
Court decisions. Legislatures originally asserted that their decisions were 
motivated by public interest concerns such as reducing crime rates and 
sentencing disparity. However, in this Article, we provide both theoretical 
reasoning and empirical evidence implying that legislatures were primarily 
influenced by political and ideological concerns.  
We begin in Part II by explaining the evolution of the shift from 
indeterminate to determinate sentencing. Under indeterminate sentencing, 
judges had considerable discretion over imposed sentences, and parole 
boards had authority over actual sentences served. However, beginning in 
the 1970s, states began to adopt determinate sentencing reforms, such as 
sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing laws, and the abolition of 
discretionary parole, in response to the growing rejection of the 
discretionary and individualized punishments under the previous system.8 
These reforms significantly reduce the power of judges and parole 
boards. Sentencing guidelines structure the sentencing process and limit 
judicial discretion by requiring judges to reference, consider, or adhere to a 
specific sentencing recommendation that is typically formulated by a state 
sentencing commission.9 The abolition of discretionary parole completely 
excludes the parole board from the prison release decision, and truth-in-
sentencing laws greatly reduce parole boards’ discretion by requiring that 
an offender serve some minimum percentage of the pronounced sentence 
before parole officials have the discretion to release the offender from 
prison.10  
These determinate sentencing reforms originally received significant 
bipartisan support. Liberals believed that the reforms, by restricting the 
discretion of judges and parole boards, would reduce sentencing 
discrimination and sentence-length disparity.11 On the other hand, 
conservatives believed that determinate sentencing reforms would result in 
more certain and more severe sentences that would reduce crime.12  
 
                                                                                                                     
 7. James Sterngold & Mark Martin, Hard Time: California’s Prisons in Crisis: High Price 
of Broken Prisons: Tough Sentencing Creates Overcrowding that Endangers Inmates, Haunts 
Taxpayers, S.F. CHRON., July 3, 2005, at A1. 
 8. See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra text immediately following note 22. 
 10. See infra note 23 and its succeeding text and text following note 37. 
 11. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.  
 12. Id. 
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However, despite this initial support, criticisms of determinate 
sentencing soon emerged. Both legal scholars and judges have argued that 
there are significant costs to reducing judges’ and parole boards’ 
discretion.13 Discretion among judges and parole boards is critical to 
assessments of deterrability and the likelihood of recidivism. Only these 
actors can tailor sentences to ensure that imprisonment serves its purpose 
and that inmates are rehabilitated. In addition, to the extent that 
determinate sentencing tended to increase the average length of sentences 
served, criticisms arose in relation to the growing burden on states’ 
budgets.  
In Part III, we explore why and under what circumstances state 
legislatures enact different permutations of reforms, and in particular, what 
factors influence legislatures to reallocate power over criminal sentencing 
across different institutional actors. We first explain why legislatures 
acting in the public interest may enact laws that constrain the discretion of 
judges and parole boards. The legislatures may be motivated by concerns 
over high crime rates, increasing correctional budgets, or sentencing 
disparity.  
Then, we develop a political economy model that explains why 
legislatures acting in their own self-interest may be motivated to enact 
these laws. Political economy theories assume that political actors are self-
interested and influenced by factors such as the pursuit of ideological 
goals, the accumulation of institutional power, or re-election concerns. Our 
model predicts that legislatures have an incentive to enact these reforms 
when their sentencing preferences differ from the preferences of judges and 
parole boards. Thus, reforms that limit the power of judges and parole 
boards are more likely to be enacted when there are differences among the 
sentencing goals of legislatures, judges, and parole boards. 
Our political economy model produces specific predictions that we test 
in Part IV. Our analyses include several variables that represent either the 
political economy concerns or public interest concerns of state legislatures. 
The political economy variables directly test the predictions of our political 
economy model; they measure the degree of political divisiveness and 
tension among the sentencing goals of legislatures, judges, and parole 
boards. Likewise, we employ specific public interest variables to test 
whether the purported social goals of determinate sentencing—reducing 
crime and controlling correctional budgets—are consistent with the actual 
data.  
We analyze data from all fifty states for the period from 1960 to 2000. 
First, we present and describe the basic data to identify general trends 
among states that have and have not enacted determinate sentencing 
reforms. Then, we perform more sophisticated analyses in order to isolate 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
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the influence of political economy variables and public interest variables 
on legislatures’ decisions to enact reforms. We estimate both maximum 
likelihood logit models and semiparametric duration models to ensure that 
our empirical findings are robust to different estimation techniques.  
Our analyses confirm that political variables are a significant influence 
on legislatures’ decisions to enact determinate sentencing reforms. For 
example, longer histories of divided government increase the likelihood 
that legislatures will enact determinate sentencing reforms. These results 
are consistent with our model’s hypothesis: long histories of divided 
government produce clashes among the sentencing goals of legislatures, 
parole boards, and judges. Our results suggest that legislatures respond to 
this tension by enacting determinate sentencing reforms that reallocate 
power away from judges and parole boards and towards the legislature 
itself.  
The weak results for most of the public interest variables suggest that 
legislatures’ public interest concerns are not the primary drivers of 
determinate sentencing reforms, as is often claimed. Instead, legislatures 
appear to be primarily motivated by political economy concerns. Namely, 
they tend to reallocate power away from judges and parole boards when 
those groups have political ideologies that conflict with the legislatures’ 
preferences. 
In Part V, we conclude and explain that understanding the motivations 
for the adoption of determinate sentencing is essential to states that are 
currently considering reform. 
II.  DETAILS OF STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING 
LEGISLATION, AND THE ABOLITION OF DISCRETIONARY PAROLE 
A complete understanding of this Article’s theoretical predictions and 
empirical findings requires a brief discussion of the purposes and history of 
state sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing legislation, and the 
abolition of discretionary parole.14 
A.  Original Goals of Determinate Sentencing 
States adopted determinate sentencing reforms in response to a growing 
rejection of the discretionary and individualized punishments under the 
previous system of indeterminate sentencing. Through the mid-1970s, all 
states and the federal system had such indeterminate systems. As Michael 
Tonry describes this period,  
 
                                                                                                                     
 14. For a related discussion of the history of sentencing guidelines, see Joanna Shepherd, 
Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 
533, 537–43 (2007). 
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Mandatory penalties were few in number and modest in 
scope, prosecutors had unaccountable power over charging 
and plea bargaining, judges’ sentencing discretion was 
constrained only by statutory sentencing maximums, and 
parole boards had broad or plenary authority to release 
prisoners subject, usually, only to the maximum prison term 
set by the judge or the legislature.15  
In the 1970s and early 1980s, sentencing practices began to change as 
three criticisms of indeterminate sentencing emerged. First, critics asserted 
that indeterminate systems’ sentencing disparities were unfair and unjust.16 
Although numerous critics of sentencing disparity emerged,17 one notable 
group was the American Friends Service Committee, which argued that 
racial discrimination was responsible for imprisonment disparities.18 
Another influential voice was then-U.S. District Court Judge Marvin 
Frankel, who argued that indeterminate sentencing was “lawless.”19  
Second, rehabilitation fell from favor as a sentencing goal. An 
important rationale for indeterminate sentencing was that if judges and 
parole boards were given discretion over sentencing and time served, they 
could individually craft sentences to match each offender’s prospects for 
rehabilitation. However, several studies conducted in the 1970s doubted 
the ability of prison programs to rehabilitate offenders.20 
Third, critics blamed indeterminate sentencing for the period’s 
dramatically increasing crime rates, asserting that sentences were too 
uncertain and too lenient.21 A leading book on crime policy argued that 
only more certain punishments could reduce crime.22 
Legislatures enacted determinate sentencing reforms to cure the 
perceived failures of indeterminate sentencing. Although states 
experimented with various reforms, the most common reforms aimed to 
directly reduce the discretion of either judges or parole boards. States 
enacted sentencing guidelines to reduce judges’ discretion over imposed 
sentences. Other states reduced parole boards’ discretion over actual time 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2005). 
 16.  See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 
OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING 1, 5–6 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/strsent.pdf. 
 17. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 33–36 (1998). 
 18. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971). 
 19. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER ix–x (1972). 
 20. See, e.g., Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison 
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 22–23, 49 (1974); James Robison & Gerald Smith, The Effectiveness of 
Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67, 80 (1971). 
 21. Tonry, supra note 15, at 1247. 
 22. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 192–94 (1st ed. 1977). 
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served by either passing truth-in-sentencing laws or by abolishing 
discretionary parole all together.  
By abolishing discretionary parole, several states have completely 
removed the role of the parole board in determining when a prisoner’s 
release should occur. Instead of a parole board making the release decision 
based on the prospects of rehabilitation and the likelihood of recidivism, 
the release date is instead determined by statute.23 
Truth-in-sentencing laws also reduce the role of parole boards by 
requiring that an offender serve some minimum percentage of the 
pronounced sentence before parole officials have the discretion to release 
the offender from prison. Although these laws have no direct impact on the 
court-imposed sentence, they do reduce the discrepancy between the 
imposed sentence and the actual time served by the offender. By restricting 
early parole, truth-in-sentencing laws greatly reduce the discretion of 
parole officials. 
Whereas truth-in-sentencing laws constrain parole decisions, sentencing 
guidelines structure the sentencing process and limit judicial discretion by 
requiring judges to reference, consider, or adhere to a specific sentencing 
recommendation. “Guideline sentences are typically based on factors such 
as offense severity, the offender’s prior record, the availability of 
punishment alternatives, and concerns for community safety.”24 The 
guidelines have narrowed the range of acceptable sentences that a judge 
may impose on a convicted offender. 
These determinate sentencing reforms ultimately became law because 
they attracted a diverse coalition with diverse goals: they promised both to 
reduce unfair disparity and to crack down on criminals.25 For example, in 
California, determinate sentencing was propelled into law by an 
improbable alliance of prisoners’ rights and civil liberties groups, law-and-
order conservatives, and police unions.26  
Liberals believed that the reforms, by restricting discretion of judges 
and parole boards, would reduce sentencing discrimination and sentence-
                                                                                                                     
 23. TODD REIMERS, SENATE RESEARCH CTR., PAROLE: THEN & NOW 1–7 (1999), available at 
http://www.senate.state.tx.us/SRC/pdf/ib0599.pdf. 
 24. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., SENTENCING DIGEST: EXAMINING CURRENT SENTENCING ISSUES 
AND POLICIES 11 (1998). 
 25. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990 (1993) (noting disdain with discretion by both liberals objecting to it 
resulting in discrimination and by conservatives decrying it leading to more crime). 
 26. See Sheldon L. Messinger & Phillip E. Johnson, California’s Determinate Sentencing 
Statute: History and Issues, in DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 13, 21–29 
(1978); Tonry, supra note 15, at 1248. See also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 38–77 
(discussing the bipartisan support for federal sentencing guidelines). Although much of the public 
discourse surrounding determinate sentencing in the 1970s and 1980s focused on the federal 
system, arguments as to sentencing guidelines’ functions and expected impacts also applied to the 
states. 
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length disparity. On the other hand, conservatives believed that determinate 
sentencing reforms would result in more certain and more severe sentences 
that would reduce crime.27 They believed that judicial and parole board 
discretion was inconsistent with deterrence.28 Conservative supporters of 
determinate sentencing could invoke former FBI director J. Edgar 
Hoover’s criticism of indeterminate sentencing. Hoover had frequently 
condemned indeterminate sentencing, asserting that both its discretionary 
sentence lengths and its focus on rehabilitation produced excessively 
lenient punishments that increased crime.29 Many others supported 
determinate sentencing as a get-tough program for crime reduction.30 
B.  History of Parole Abolition, Sentencing Guidelines, and 
Truth-in-Sentencing Legislation 
Despite the bipartisan support for determinate sentencing, the 
enactment of specific determinate sentencing reforms varied among the 
states. In 1975, Maine became the first state to abolish discretionary parole. 
Other states soon followed, and by 2000, fourteen states had abolished 
discretionary parole release. Table 1 presents the states that have abolished 
discretionary parole along with the year in which the state legislature 
abolished discretionary parole.31 
 
Table 1 
States Abolishing Discretionary Parole 
State Year Enacted State Year Enacted 
Arizona 1994 Minnesota 1980 
Delaware 1990 New Mexico 1979 
Illinois 1978 North Carolina 1994 
Indiana 1977 Ohio 1996 
Kansas 1993 Oregon 1989 
Maine 1975 Virginia 1995 
Mississippi 1995 Washington 1984 
 
Although Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt truth-in-
sentencing legislation in 1911, several other states enacted similar laws in 
                                                                                                                     
 27. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 104. 
 28. See id. at 59, 104 (discussing the perceived conflict between deterrence and judicial 
discretion). 
 29. Id. at 31 (citing J. Edgar Hoover, The Dire Consequences of the Premature Release of 
Dangerous Criminals through Probation and Parole, 27 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1 (1958)). 
 30. For a discussion, see id. at 38–48. 
 31. Reimers, supra note 23, at 3 fig.2. 
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the 1980s and 1990s. To further encourage the movement away from 
indeterminate sentencing, the federal government passed the 1994 Crime 
Act,32 which awards grants to states that can prove that offenders convicted 
of a Part 1 violent crime serve at least 85% of their sentences.33 Between 
1996 and 1999, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia qualified 
for the federal truth-in-sentencing grants.34 Table 2 presents the states that 
enacted truth-in-sentencing laws and their year of enactment.  
 
Table 2 
States Enacting Truth-in-Sentencing Laws  
State Year Enacted State Year Enacted 
Arizona 1993 New Hampshire 1982 
California 1994 New Jersey 1997 
Connecticut 1994 New York 1995 
Delaware 1989 North Carolina 1993 
Florida 1995 North Dakota 1995 
Georgia 1994 Ohio 1995 
Illinois 1995 Oklahoma 1997 
Iowa 1996 Oregon 1989 
Kansas 1992 Pennsylvania 1911 
Louisiana 1995 South Carolina 1995 
Maine 1995 South Dakota 1996 
Michigan 1994 Tennessee 1995 
Minnesota 1992 Virginia 1994 
Mississippi 1995 Washington 1990 
Missouri 1994 Wisconsin 1999 
 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796 (1994). 
 33. Part 1 violent crimes are “murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, 
and aggravated assault as reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for purposes of the 
Uniform Crime Reports . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §13701(2). 
 34. The table is based on data from four publications. THOMAS J. HAMMER & MICHAEL B. 
BRENNAN, 2001 WISCONSIN ACT 109: CRIMES AND THEIR PENALTIES 3 (2003), 
http://www.wisspd.org/html/forprac/TISpartII.pdf; WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES 
AND PRISON POPULATIONS (2002), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195163.pdf; WILLIAM J. 
SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING 
REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS 11 tbl.1.5 
(2002) [hereinafter SABOL, POLICY CENTER REPORT], http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410470_ 
FINALTISrpt.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING: AVAILABILITY OF 
FEDERAL GRANTS INFLUENCED LAWS IN SOME STATES 6 fig.1 (1998), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98042.pdf. 
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First developed during the late 1970s and early 1980s, sentencing 
guidelines currently apply in the federal courts, eighteen states, and the 
District of Columbia. Table 3 lists the states that have enacted sentencing 
guidelines and the years of adoption.35  
 
Table 3 
States Enacting Sentencing Guidelines  
State Year Enacted State Year Enacted 
Arkansas 1994 North Carolina 1994 
Delaware 1987 Ohio 1996 
Florida 1983 Oregon 1989 
Kansas 1993 Pennsylvania 1982 
Louisiana 1992 Tennessee 1989 
Maryland 1983 Utah 1993 
Michigan 1981 Virginia 1991 
Minnesota 1980 Washington 1984 
Missouri 1997 Wisconsin 1985 
 
C.  The Reforms’ Effects on the Discretion of Judges and  
Parole Boards 
The states’ determinate sentencing reforms are not identical.36 Truth-in-
sentencing laws often differ in the percentage of the imposed sentence they 
require convicted offenders to serve. Sentencing guidelines vary in the 
degree to which judges are forced to comply with the guidelines and, 
hence, in how strongly they constrain judges.37 The states that have 
abolished discretionary parole have established a variety of alternative 
systems to determine parole eligibility. Despite the differences, all varieties 
of these reforms have achieved their goals of limiting the discretion of 
either the judges or the parole boards.  
The abolishment of discretionary parole has significantly reduced the 
role of parole boards in determining inmates’ releases. In states that have 
abolished discretionary parole, inmates are instead released by mandatory 
                                                                                                                     
 35. The table is based on data from three publications: Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing 
Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1196 
(2005); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 16, at 28 tbl.3-5; SABOL, POLICY CENTER 
REPORT, supra note 34. At least seven other states—Connecticut, Maine, Texas, Colorado, Nevada, 
New York, and Montana—have decided, after consideration, against guidelines; Frase, supra, at 
1197. 
 36. Many authors have discussed similarities and differences. See generally Frase, supra note 
35 (analyzing the diversity in state sentencing guidelines). 
 37. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 24. 
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parole, and release dates are determined by statute. In 1976, 65% of state 
prison releases were by discretionary parole. However, by 1999, only 24% 
of state prison releases were by discretionary parole, while the remaining 
76% were mandatory parole releases.38  
Removing parole boards from release decisions has substantially 
increased the percentage of the court-imposed sentences served by prison 
inmates. In 1999, inmates released by discretionary parole had served only 
37% of their imposed sentences, whereas inmates released by mandatory 
parole had served 61% of their imposed sentences.39 
Truth-in-sentencing laws have also reduced the discretion of parole 
boards in determining the time served by criminal offenders. In states with 
discretionary parole release, truth-in-sentencing laws prevent parole boards 
from releasing inmates before they have served the designated percentage 
of their sentence. The laws have significantly increased the percentage of 
the sentence that released inmates must serve. Whereas prisoners released 
in 1996 served on average only 44% of their sentence,40 prisoners admitted 
to prison in states with truth-in-sentencing laws served a significantly 
greater percentage of their sentence. For example, thirteen states that 
qualified for the Federal Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants reported 
prison release data for 1997. Seven of those states reported that prisoners 
released in 1997 served more than 85% of their imposed sentence, and an 
additional four states reported that inmates served between 70% and 84% 
of their imposed sentence.  
Whereas the abolition of discretionary parole and enactment of truth-in-
sentencing legislation greatly reduces the discretion of parole boards, 
sentencing guidelines constrain judges and cause them to impose different 
sentences than they would impose in the absence of the guidelines. 
Individual states have conducted pre- and post-guidelines evaluations of 
sentences and have concluded that sentencing guidelines have significantly 
changed sentencing practices. For example, Minnesota has determined that 
before the guidelines, only 62% of sentences had fallen within what the 
guidelines later established as the recommended range. During the first 
three years after the guidelines, at least 77% of sentences were within the 
recommended range.41 Likewise, other states have found that the use of 
guidelines greatly reduces the variability in sentences that resulted from 
judicial discretion. For example, the 1983 Washington guidelines caused 
                                                                                                                     
 38. JEREMY TRAVIS & SARAH LAWRENCE, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., BEYOND THE 
PRISON GATES: THE STATE OF PAROLE IN AMERICA 4 (2002), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/  
310583_Beyond_prison_gates.pdf. 
 39. TIMOTHY A. HUGHES ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRENDS IN STATE PAROLE, 
1990–2000, at 7 (2001).  
 40. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRUTH IN 
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1, 13 tbl.14 (1999). 
 41. KAY A. KNAPP, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR 
EVALUATION 43 (1984). 
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sentence-length variability to decrease by 60%.42 The variability of 
Oregon’s sentence lengths was reduced by 45% after the imposition of 
their guidelines.43 
D.  Reactions to Determinate Sentencing Reforms 
Proponents of determinate sentencing reforms have been delighted with 
the success of these reforms.44 Sentencing guidelines have generally 
achieved the legislatures’ goals of reducing variability in sentences and 
increasing sentence lengths.45 Moreover, supporters point to evidence that 
by curbing the discretion of judges and parole boards, determinate 
sentencing reforms have curbed racial discrimination in sentencing.46 
However, other commentators, both from academia and from within the 
criminal justice system, have noted the large costs associated with the 
increasing constraints on judges’ and parole boards’ discretion. For 
example, Richard Frase has identified the harms that result when 
guidelines systems make assessments of deterrability and likelihood of 
recidivism “on the basis of group or actuarial risk, rather than 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Shepherd, supra note 14, at 564. 
 43. KATHRYN ASHFORD & CRAIG MOSBAEK, OR. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL, FIRST YEAR 
REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES: NOVEMBER 1989 TO JANUARY 1990, at 17 
(1991). 
 44. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 25, at 145–56. 
 45. After Minnesota’s implementation of sentencing guidelines in 1980, the rate of 
imprisonment for violent crimes increased from 61.1% to 85.9%, and average sentence lengths for 
violent crimes also increased. KAY A. KNAPP, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION 21 (1984). After adoption of the 1982 Pennsylvania 
sentencing guidelines, incarceration rates for violent crimes increased from 44% to 64% for 
aggravated assault, from 74% to 86% for rape, and from 67% to 74% for robbery. John H. Kramer 
& Robin L. Lubitz, Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Reform: The Impact of Commission-Established 
Guidelines, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 481, 497 tbl.6 (1985). Sentence lengths also increased: from 8.5 
months to 13.6 months for aggravated assault, from 41.5 months to 51.9 months for rape, and from 
21.1 months to 21.6 months for robbery. Id. The 1983 Washington guidelines caused imprisonment 
rates for violent offenses to increase from 48.8% to 65.1% from 1982 to 1985. In addition, sentence 
lengths for violent crimes increased: sentences for murder increased from an average of 75 months 
to a range of 109–164 months; robbery sentences increased from an average of 40 months to a range 
of 40–60 months. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF 
WASHINGTON STATE’S SENTENCING REFORM ACT app. C at 49 (1986). After Oregon’s 
implementation of sentencing guidelines in 1989, imprisonment rates for violent crimes increased 
from 62% to 89% for homicide, from 29% to 37% for assault, from 40% to 61% for rape, and from 
50% to 61% for robbery. ED DEERY, OR. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, FELONY SENTENCING IN 
OREGON 1994, at 49 (1997). Average sentence lengths for violent crimes increased from 34.4 to 
119.8 months for homicide, from 26.1 to 32.1 months for assault, from 33.6 to 36.4 months for 
robbery, and from 40.1 to 76.7 months for rape. Id. at 50. The North Carolina sentencing guidelines 
enacted in 1994 have increased the imprisonment rate for violent offenders from 67% to 81% and 
increased the average sentence length from 56 months to 87 months. Robin L. Lubitz, Sentencing 
Changes in North Carolina, in PENAL REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 84, 86 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2001).  
 46. STEPHEN P. KLEIN ET AL., RACIAL EQUITY IN SENTENCING 11 (1988). 
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individualized, case-by-case diagnoses.”47 Likewise, judges have been 
furious that guidelines spurn judges’ skill and experience in evaluating 
deterrability and the ability to be rehabilitated and that the guidelines 
discard the individualized knowledge about the defendant that the judge 
gains during pretrial proceedings and trial.48 For example, Oregon Judge 
Michael Marcus has long opposed the reduced discretion under sentencing 
guidelines. He notes, “[O]ffenders for whom public safety is best achieved 
by disparate dispositions . . . should be treated differently. That an identical 
crime can be committed by a psychopath or by an addict susceptible to 
recovery (with equal criminal histories) does not compel identical 
dispositions as a matter of fairness.”49 
In a survey by the Federal Judicial Center in 1996, about 80% of district 
and appellate judges said that they thought judges should be given more 
discretion than permitted under the guidelines.50 In a 2002 survey of 
federal court judges, 45% of the responding judges said that the federal 
guidelines were too inflexible.51 Indeed, many judges are so outraged at 
sentencing guidelines that they claim to have decided to retire early to 
avoid sentencing with such limited discretion.52  
Concerned that guidelines restricted necessary sentencing discretion, 
many judges admit to evading the system. In a series of interviews with 
California municipal court judges, the judges admitted to using “a variety 
of methods to expand their discretion, including refusing plea bargains, 
assignment of offenders to probation and community service, creative 
interpretation of statutes, and recommendations to the probation 
department to allow alternative placements for mandatory sentences.”53  
                                                                                                                     
 47. Frase, supra note 35, at 433–34. 
 48.  Michael Marcus, Blakely, Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 
243, 244 (2005); Harlington Wood Jr., Panel Remarks, Is “Relevant Conduct” Relevant? 
Reconsidering the Guidelines’ Approach to Real Offense Sentencing, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 418, 
418–21 (2000). 
 49. Marcus, supra note 48, at 245. Other scholars discuss similar concerns. See, e.g., Daniel 
J. Freed & Marc Miller, Handcuffing the Sentencing Judge: Are Offender Characteristics Becoming 
Irrelevant? Are Congressionally Mandated Sentences Displacing Judicial Discretion?, 2 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 189, 189 (1989/1990). 
 50. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, FED, JUDICIAL CTR., THE U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 6 (1997), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/gssurv 
ey.pdf/$file/gssurvey.pdf. 
 51. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Surveying Article III Judges’ Perspectives on the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 215, 216 (2003). The survey was sent to all active 
Article III judges. One-half of the district court judges and one-third of the appellate judges 
responded. Id. at 215. The full survey report can be found at 
http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/judsurv.htm. 
 52. See Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions 
of Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231, 251 (2004) (suggesting “that the sentencing guidelines 
have led district court judges to select senior status earlier. Specifically, judges take senior status 
after .4 years instead of after 3 years of eligibility”). 
 53. Jon’a Meyer & Paul Jesilow, The Formation of Judicial Bias in Sentencing: Preliminary 
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Other studies provide empirical evidence that is consistent with judges’ 
evasion of the guidelines. They find that both judges and juries are more 
likely to acquit as the punishment following a conviction increases.54 
Moreover, the likelihood of acquittal is even higher when judges and juries 
have little control over the punishment required by a conviction, as in 
guidelines systems.55 
Commentators have expressed similar concerns over the reduction in 
the parole boards’ discretion over time served. Many have asserted that 
treating all inmates in the same manner by requiring them to serve at least 
some minimum percentage of their sentence does not promote equality: 
“Equality does not mean sameness; the term more commonly refers to the 
consistent application of a comprehensible principle or mix of principles to 
different cases. Excessive aggregation—treating unlike cases alike—can 
violate rather than promote the principle of equality.”56 
Others have argued that parole board discretion is necessary to revisit 
the need for long terms of incarceration. Parole boards are critical to 
assessing when imprisonment has served its purpose, when inmates have 
been rehabilitated, and when the likelihood of recidivism is low.57 In 
contrast, requiring inmates to serve a set percentage of their imposed 
sentence undermines the efficacy of incapacitation: 
 
                                                                                                                     
Findings on “Doing Justice,” 22 W. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 279 (1995). 
 54. See Martin F. Kaplan & Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties Under the Control of Others 
Can Reduce Guilt Verdicts, 10 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 8 (1986) (analyzing a hypothesis that 
judges or juries are more likely to render  acquittals when they have little control over a mandated  
punishment to avoid the imposition of inappropriate sentences); Norbert L. Kerr, Severity of 
Prescribed Penalty and Mock Jurors’ Verdicts, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1431, 1439 
(1978) (“Increasing the severity of the prescribed penalty for an offence resulted in an adjustment of 
subjects’ conviction criteria such that more proof of guilt was required for conviction and thus 
resulted in a reduced probability of conviction.”); Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making 
Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 793–94 (1979) (finding that acquittals 
are more likely when charged offense is serious); Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on 
the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 211, 
216 (1972) (“The present data indicate that restricting the decision alternatives available to [mock] 
jurors, especially when the guilty alternative has a consequence which is perceived to be too severe, 
may increase the likelihood of obtaining a not guilty verdict.”). 
 55. James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the 
Penalty Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. ECON. 385 (1991) (presents a model where juries hoping to 
avoid wrongful convictions are less likely to convict after sentencing guidelines are enacted); 
Kaplan & Krupa, supra note 54 (concluding that judges and juries want to be sure that appropriate 
sentences are imposed); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, WASH. 
U. L.Q. 151, 207, 210–11 (2005) (empirical evidence is consistent with the theory that judges are 
less likely to convict under the guidelines). 
 56. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 916 (1991). 
 57. Kate Stith, Two Fronts for Sentencing Reform, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 343, 343–44 (2008). 
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It is difficult enough to determine a person’s present 
dangerousness—whether he would commit an offense if 
released today. It is much more difficult to predict an 
offender's future dangerousness—whether he would commit 
an offense if released at the end of the deserved punishment 
term in the future. It is still more difficult, if not impossible, 
to predict today precisely how long the future preventive 
detention will need to last. Yet that is what determinate 
sentencing demands: the imposition now of a fixed term that 
predicts preventive needs far in the future.58 
Similarly, other critics argue that the possibility of early release 
provides a strong incentive for many inmates to behave well and 
participate in programs that aid in their rehabilitation.59 Because both truth-
in-sentencing laws and the abolishment of discretionary parole effectively 
eliminate the possibility of early release, they take away hope for the 
inmates and reduce the incentive to behave and enroll in rehabilitative 
programs.60 
Finally, legal scholars are also concerned that discretionary parole 
release allows correctional officials to manage the prison population.61 In 
contrast, when release dates are set by statute, parole boards are incapable 
of controlling prison overcrowding by releasing low-risk and well-behaved 
inmates. Moreover, truth-in-sentencing laws exacerbate the problem of 
prison overcrowding by increasing the time served by prison inmates, at 
least when holding fixed the sentence imposed and ignoring the strategic 
responses of judges and juries as discussed above.62 
Despite the numerous concerns about limiting judges’ and parole 
boards’ discretion, many state legislatures have enacted determinate 
sentencing reforms. In the next Part, we explore why and under what 
circumstances state legislatures enact different permutations of reforms, in 
particular when they reallocate power over criminal sentencing across 
different institutional actors.  
III.  EXPLAINING THE ENACTMENT OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 
TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING, AND ABOLITION OF DISCRETIONARY PAROLE 
The decision by legislatures to enact laws that constrain the discretion 
of other government officials is typically explained by either “public 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive 
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1452 (2001). 
 59. Nora V. Demleitner, Good Conduct Time: How Much and For Whom? The Unprincipled 
Approach of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 777, 779 (2009). 
 60. Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & 
JUST. 479, 480–81 (1999). 
 61. REIMERS, supra note 23, at 2. 
 62. Joseph A. Colquitt, Essay, Can Alabama Handle the Truth (in Sentencing)?, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 425, 436 (2009). 
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interest” theory or “political economy” theory.63 Public interest theory 
predicts that legislatures’ decisions are determined by the potential costs 
and benefits to society of legislation. On the other hand, political economy 
theory focuses on the self-interest of political actors, rather than their 
faithful representation of the public interest. In this Part, we first explain 
why legislatures acting in the public interest may enact laws that constrain 
the discretion of judges and parole boards. Then we develop a political 
economy model that explains why legislatures acting in their own self-
interest may be motivated to enact these laws. 
A.  Public Interest Theory 
Public interest theory asserts that legislators act as faithful agents of 
their constituents as they seek to further the welfare of the general public.64 
Thus, the legislature would enact determinate sentencing reforms that 
reduce discretion when doing so is in the best interests of society. Under 
this theory, the primary factors driving the trend towards curtailing 
discretion should be the social costs of crime and incarceration. For 
example, excessively lenient judges and parole boards may reduce both the 
incapacitative and deterrent functions of criminal punishment, causing 
crime rates to increase. Thus, legislatures acting in the public interest 
might pass laws that limit the judges’ and parole boards’ discretion in order 
to reduce crime rates. On the other hand, excessively severe judges and 
parole boards might produce lower crime rates but at the cost of straining 
the correctional budget. Legislatures acting in the public interest might 
enact legislation that reduces the judges’ and parole boards’ discretion in 
order to lessen the fiscal burdens on the state.  
Alternatively, judges and parole boards might make inconsistent 
sentencing decisions, producing erratic, discriminatory, or unpredictable 
sentence lengths. The public is likely to view these inconsistent sentences 
as unjust, and unpredictable sentences might cause both increases in crime 
and difficulty in managing correctional budgets.65 Thus, legislatures acting 
in the public interest may limit the discretion of the judges and parole 
boards in order to produce more uniform, predictable sentences. 
Ultimately, legislatures acting in the public interest should weigh the 
social benefits and social costs of crime, sentences, and incarceration costs 
to achieve the correct balance.66 Many states claim that these public 
                                                                                                                     
 63. For a discussion of several public interest theories, see generally WALKER, supra note 25. 
 64. For pioneering discussions of the “public interest” theory of regulation, see Sam 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211, 217 (1976) and 
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974). 
 65. For a discussion of unpredictable sentences’ effect on crime rates, see Shepherd, supra 
note 14, at 586–87. 
 66. It is important to note the social benefits and costs alluded to here can include 
noneconomic factors, such as the expression of values held by the public in relation to crime, as 
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interest concerns were the primary drivers of determinate sentencing 
reforms. One of the purported goals of sentencing guidelines was to 
increase imprisonment for many criminal offenders.67 In many states, the 
guideline legislation itself explicitly states that crime reduction is a central 
goal.68 For example, Tennessee’s enabling statute states that the purpose of 
sentencing guidelines is “to prevent crime and promote respect for the law 
by . . . providing an effective general deterrent to those likely to violate the 
criminal laws of this state . . . .”69 Indeed, the states that have conducted 
pre- and post-guidelines implementation studies have all found that their 
state’s average incarceration rates and sentence lengths increased 
substantially under the systems using sentencing guidelines.70  
Similarly, truth-in-sentencing legislation and the abolishment of 
discretionary parole were also motivated by concerns over rising crime 
rates. Discretionary parole release came “to symbolize the leniency of a 
system in which inmates [were] ‘let out’ early.”71 Abolishing discretionary 
parole was expected to increase the length of prison time served.72 
Similarly, truth-in-sentencing laws have been embraced to ensure long 
prison terms for criminal offenders.73 
Some legislatures that enacted determinate sentencing reforms were 
also influenced by the desire to control the fiscal burdens of imprisonment. 
These states adopted sentencing guidelines in the hope of producing more 
predictable sentences and controlling prison expenditures.74 In contrast, 
many legislatures recognized that reforms that increased sentence lengths, 
such as parole abolition and truth-in-sentencing laws, might increase 
incarceration costs.75 
                                                                                                                     
well as economic benefits and costs. 
 67. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 38–48. 
 68. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 16, at 39 tbl.4-2. 
 69. TENN. CODE ANN. §40-35-102(3) & (3)(A) (2005). Likewise, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oregon, and Washington cite public safety as a primary concern of guidelines. For a list of the 
purposes of guidelines in individual states’ enabling legislation, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE, supra note 16, at 39 tbl.4-2. 
 70. See supra note 45.  
 71. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & 
JUST. 479, 479–80 (1999). 
 72. REIMERS, supra note 23, at 3.  
 73. MICHAEL TONRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 175721, THE FRAGMENTATION OF 
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 1 (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/  
nij/175721.pdf. 
 74. Rachel E. Barkow and Kathleen M. O’Neill argue that a desire to restrain growth in the 
costs of incarceration is an important factor in explaining the creation of sentencing commissions 
and the adoption of guidelines. However, they find mixed evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of 
Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 2006 tbl.2, 2009 & n.169 
(2006). 
 75. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 34, at 9 fig.2. 
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Moreover, other states were motivated to enact determinate sentencing 
reforms in order to increase uniformity in prison sentences. One of the 
primary goals of sentencing guidelines was to increase sentence uniformity 
by requiring or recommending that judges impose sentences within a 
predetermined range.76 Similarly, discretionary parole release was often 
perceived as producing disparate release dates for similar criminals.77 Both 
the abolition of discretionary parole and the implementation of truth-in-
sentencing legislation were expected to increase uniformity in time served 
by offenders because release dates would be set by statute. 
Our empirical analysis includes several control variables to measure the 
influence of public interest factors on legislatures’ decisions to enact 
determinate sentencing reforms. 
B.  A Political Economy Model 
In addition to public interest concerns, legislators considering 
determinate sentencing reforms may be motivated by their own self-
interest. Political economy theories assume that political actors are self-
interested and influenced by factors such as the pursuit of ideological 
goals, the accumulation of institutional power, or re-election concerns.78 
We develop a political economy model to explain why legislatures 
enact laws that constrain the discretion of judges and parole boards. This 
theory necessarily focuses on political variables to explain states’ adoption 
of guidelines and truth-in-sentencing laws. For example, when the state 
legislature and judiciary are dominated by different political parties, there 
could be a political interest in adopting stricter guidelines to indirectly 
exercise influence on the bench. Similarly, when parole boards’ political 
ideologies conflict with legislatures’ goals, legislatures may have a 
political interest in enacting constraints on parole.  
Our model assumes that there are three primary actors in this process–
the judiciary, the legislature, and the parole board. All three sets of actors 
potentially have distinct preferences over the sentences served by 
offenders. Their preferences may differ significantly if the actors place 
different priorities on factors such as public interest concerns, electoral and 
fundraising goals, or maintenance of the status quo.  
                                                                                                                     
 76. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 33–36. 
 77. See generally Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
542, 543 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (noting that “parole release decisions were essentially unguided 
by rule or principle, went unexplained, and were not appealable”). 
 78. Of course, re-election concerns can align politicians’ objectives with the public interest. 
The political economy approach thus involves the additional assumption that such alignment is 
imperfect, allowing politicians some leeway to pursue ideological and power-related goals. For 
recent evidence suggesting that legislators are not tightly constrained by voters’ preferences, see, for 
instance, Ebonya L. Washington, Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator 
Fathers’ Voting on Women’s Issues, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 311 (2008) (arguing in support of a 
hypothesis that a congressperson’s propensity to vote liberal increases as a function of the number 
of daughters). 
1056 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
The sequence of actions in our political economy model of determinate 
sentencing reforms is as follows. First, the legislature enacts legislation, 
which may or may not include guidelines or rules affecting the granting of 
parole. Then, the judiciary imposes sentences on convicted offenders. 
Finally, the parole board decides how much of that sentence each of the 
offenders serves before being granted parole. Each relevant actor seeks to 
achieve an outcome—the incarceration length or sentence actually served 
by offenders—that is as close as possible to its preferred sentence, subject 
to the applicable constraints, such as the need to build majoritarian 
coalitions or limits on discretion imposed by statute.79 
Clearly, this model is a highly simplified representation that does not 
fully capture the complexities of the legislative and criminal justice 
processes. However, the fundamental test of a model lies not in its 
complexity but rather in whether its simplifications yield important 
insights and testable hypotheses about the phenomena being analyzed. 
1.  Outcomes with No Sentencing Guidelines or Constraints on 
Parole 
We begin with the simplest version of our model—sentencing in the 
absence of guidelines or constraints on discretionary rule. In this simple 
model, the parole board enjoys a last-mover advantage. However, the 
parole board can achieve its preferences over incarceration lengths only if 
the parole board prefers less severe sentences than the judiciary. For 
example, suppose the judiciary prefers that a specific type of offender 
serves ten years. If a parole board prefers that such offenders serve only 
five years, then offenders will only serve five years; the parole board with 
discretion over release dates can release the offenders after they serve five 
years of their ten-year term.80  In contrast, if the parole board prefers 
fifteen-year sentences for these offenders while the judiciary prefers ten-
year sentences, the offenders will only serve ten years. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 79. This means that, for example, the sentence imposed by a judge can differ from the 
sentence she actually prefers, as she may have to compromise between her true preferences and the 
constraints created by external accountability. It is important to note that we assume that 
preferences apply to sentence lengths actually served by the offender, rather than to the nominal 
sentence that is imposed by the court. It may be possible to argue that nominal sentences may have 
an “expressive” effect in giving voice to society’s disapproval of crime. However, policy 
preferences are more likely to pertain to actual sentences served, as these influence the level of 
deterrence and incapacitation of offenders. Moreover, any expressive effect of nominal sentences is 
likely to be undermined when the public perceives a divergence between nominal and actual 
sentences. 
 80. This is, of course, subject to a number of caveats. For instance, parole boards will 
consider factors such as the prisoner’s behavior in prison when determining whether the prisoner 
should be released. However, in the example above, the parole board will seek to release offenders 
after five years, on average. 
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Thus, the parole board can effectively reduce incarceration lengths, but 
they cannot increase incarceration lengths beyond the court-imposed 
sentence. The parole board’s “last-mover advantage”—its ability to 
determine unilaterally the actual sentence served—is only relevant when 
the judiciary prefers more severe sentences. Hence, in the absence of 
guidelines and laws constraining the parole board, our model predicts that 
i) the judges’ preferences prevail when they prefer lenient sentences, ii) the 
parole boards’ preferences prevail when it prefers lenient sentences, and 
iii) severe sentences can only be achieved when both judges and parole 
boards prefer more severe sentences. Figure 1 depicts this relationship 
between judges’ and parole boards’ preferences and sentence lengths. 
 
Figure 1 
The Relationship Between Judges’ and Parole Boards’ Preferences and 
Sentence Lengths 
Moreover, our model also predicts that legislatures have no incentive to 
constrain either parole boards or judges if the legislatures’ preferences 
coincide with the preferences of the actor that controls incarceration 
lengths. If the legislature has lenient preferences similar to those of either 
judges or parole boards, then the legislature achieves its preferred 
incarceration lengths. For example, if both judges and the legislature prefer 
five-year sentences, but the parole board prefers ten-year sentences, then 
both the court-imposed sentence and the incarceration length are five years. 
Similarly, if both parole boards and the legislature prefer five-year 
sentences, but judges prefer ten-year sentences, then the court-imposed 
sentence is ten years, but incarceration lengths are only five years.  
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2.  Extension One: Constraints on Parole 
Consider now an extension of the simple model to include constraints 
on parole—either the abolition of discretionary parole or the enactment of 
truth-in-sentencing laws. As an immediate consequence of constraints on 
parole, the parole board can no longer undermine the sentencing 
preferences of the judiciary. Thus, the enactment of constraints on parole 
increases judges’ influence over sentencing because incarceration lengths 
are closer to the court-imposed sentences.  
Our model yields two predictions. First, constraints on parole will only 
affect incarceration lengths when parole boards prefer more lenient 
sentences than judges. As our simple model already revealed, parole 
boards’ preferences only affect incarceration lengths when parole boards 
prefer more lenient sentences than judges. In contrast, if parole boards had 
more severe preferences than judges, constraints on parole would have no 
effect on sentences.  
Second, our model predicts that legislatures have an incentive to enact 
constraints on parole only when parole boards’ preferences are more 
lenient than those of the legislature. If the parole boards’ preferences are 
more severe than the legislatures’ preferences, then constraints on parole 
will not help legislatures achieve their desired incarceration lengths.  
To illustrate the reasoning, consider the following three examples. First, 
suppose that the parole board prefers sentences of five years, and both the 
legislature and the judiciary prefer ten-year sentences. Constraints on 
parole will cause incarceration lengths to increase from five to ten years. 
Without constraints on parole, the court-imposed sentence is ten years, but 
the parole board releases inmates after five years; with constraints on 
parole, both the court-imposed sentence and the incarceration length are 
ten years. 
In contrast, assume that the legislature prefers five-year sentences while 
the parole board and judiciary prefer ten-year sentences. Now the 
legislature has no incentive to enact constraints on parole; with or without 
constraints on parole, both the court-imposed sentence and the 
incarceration period are ten years. Similarly, if both the legislature and the 
parole board prefer five-year sentences, but the judiciary prefers ten-year 
sentences, there is no reason to enact constraints on parole; the parole 
board is already achieving the legislatures’ preferences by releasing 
inmates early.81 
                                                                                                                     
 81. However, it is important to recognize that legislatures may enact constraints on parole for 
strategic reasons, even if the constraints will not affect incarceration lengths. For example, 
legislatures may engage in “position-taking” by signaling to the electorate that they are “tough on 
crime” while allowing the parole boards to enforce relatively lenient sentences that are closer to the 
legislature’s true preferences. For a discussion of position-taking in legislatures, see, for example, 
Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive 
Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 1 (2003) (contrasting 
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Thus, our model predicts that legislatures have an incentive to enact 
constraints on parole only when parole boards’ preferences are more 
lenient than the legislature’s.  
3.  Extension Two: Sentencing Guidelines 
Consider another extension of the model to include only sentencing 
guidelines with no constraints on parole. Legislatures enact sentencing 
guidelines to provide judges with either a mandatory or recommended 
range of sentences. The minimum sentences in the guidelines’ range will 
constrain only lenient judges who would prefer to impose a sentence below 
the minimum; the minimum sentence is irrelevant for judges with severe 
sentencing preferences. However, our model predicts that the minimum 
sentence only affects incarceration lengths when parole boards have severe 
preferences. If the parole board is more lenient than judges and the 
legislature, it can undermine the court-imposed sentence with or without 
guidelines.  
To illustrate this reasoning, suppose that judges prefer five-year 
sentences, the parole board prefers ten-year sentences, and the guidelines’ 
sentencing range is eight to ten years. Before the guidelines, both the court-
imposed sentence and the incarceration length would be five years; after 
the guideline, both the court-imposed sentence and the incarceration length 
would be eight years. Thus, because the parole board is more severe than 
judges, sentencing guidelines will affect incarceration periods. 
In contrast, assume that parole boards have more lenient preferences 
than judges. Assume that the parole board prefers five years, the judiciary 
prefers seven years, and the guidelines’ sentencing range is eight to twelve 
years. The guidelines do not affect incarceration lengths. Prior to the 
guidelines, the court-imposed sentence was seven years and parole boards 
released inmates after five years; after the guidelines, the judges impose 
sentences of eight years, but parole boards still release inmates after five 
years. Thus, because the lenient parole board can undermine the court-
imposed sentence with or without guidelines, the guidelines do not affect 
incarceration lengths. 
Similarly, the maximum sentence in the guidelines’ range will constrain 
only severe judges who would prefer to impose a longer sentence. 
However, our model predicts that the guidelines’ maximum sentence only 
affects incarceration lengths when the parole board has severe preferences. 
If the parole board is more lenient than judges and the legislature, then they 
can undermine the court-imposed sentence with or without sentencing 
guidelines.  
                                                                                                                     
outcome-oriented preferences where legislatures are concerned with legislative outcomes as are 
voters likely to reward or punish the legislature, as a whole, with position-taking preferences where 
voters reward or punish individual legislators, distinguishing among those who voted favorably and 
unfavorably to voter wishes). 
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For example, assume that the judiciary favors ten years, the parole 
board prefers fifteen years, and the guidelines’ sentencing range is eight to 
twelve years. Prior to the guidelines, both the court-imposed sentence and 
the incarceration length were ten years; after the guidelines, both the court-
imposed sentence and the incarceration length will be twelve years. Thus, 
because the parole board is more severe than judges, sentencing guidelines 
will affect incarceration lengths.  
In contrast, assume that that the parole board prefers five years, the 
judiciary favors fifteen years, and the guidelines’ sentencing range is eight 
to twelve years. Prior to the guidelines, judges imposed sentences of fifteen 
years and parole boards released inmates after five years; after the 
guidelines, judges impose sentences of twelve years and parole boards 
release inmates after five years. Thus, because the parole board is more 
lenient than the judges, the guidelines will not change the incarceration 
lengths.  
Thus, our model predicts that sentencing guidelines affect incarceration 
lengths either when the judiciary is more lenient or more severe than the 
legislature but only if the parole board has severe preferences over 
sentencing. A lenient parole board can undermine sentences with or 
without the guidelines. Thus, the legislature has the incentive to introduce 
sentencing guidelines when the judiciary’s preferences are too extreme 
relative to the legislature—either too lenient or too severe—but only when 
the parole board also has severe preferences. 
4.  Extension Three: Sentencing Guidelines and Constraints on 
Parole 
Finally, we extend our model to consider the circumstances in which 
legislatures might want to enact both sentencing guidelines and constraints 
on parole. Recall that our model’s first extension predicted that legislatures 
will enact constraints on parole when the parole board is too lenient. Our 
model’s second extension predicted that legislatures will enact sentencing 
guidelines when the judiciary’s preferences are either too lenient or too 
severe but only when the parole board has severe preferences.  
Our model’s final extension completes this picture; legislatures will 
enact both sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole when the 
judiciary’s preferences are either too lenient or too severe but only when 
the parole board has lenient preferences. When parole is constrained, the 
guidelines directly affect the judiciary’s discretion over incarceration 
lengths because the parole board can no longer undermine the court-
imposed sentence. Our model reveals that when judges are very lenient, the 
guidelines’ minimum sentence binds and judicial influence is reduced. 
When judges are quite severe, the guidelines’ maximum sentence binds; 
judicial influence is also reduced. However, if judges had the same 
preferences as the legislature, there would be no reason to limit their 
discretion with sentencing guidelines. 
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To illustrate the reasoning, consider the following two examples. First, 
consider the case when both the parole board and judiciary are more lenient 
than the legislature. Assume that both the judiciary and the parole board 
prefer sentences of five years, but the legislature prefers sentences of ten 
years. If there are no constraints on discretion, both the court-imposed 
sentence and the incarceration length are five years. If only constraints on 
parole are enacted, the court-imposed sentence and incarceration length 
remain five years. If only sentencing guidelines of, say, ten to twelve years 
are enacted, the court imposes a sentence of ten years, but the parole board 
still releases inmates in five years. Only both sentencing guidelines and 
constraints on parole will achieve the legislature’s preferences. If both 
constraints are enacted, judges impose ten-year sentences, and the court-
imposed sentence cannot be undermined by parole boards.  
Next, consider the case of a lenient parole board and a judiciary that is 
more severe than the legislature. Assume that the judiciary prefers fifteen-
year sentences, the parole board prefers five-year sentences, but the 
legislature prefers ten-year sentences. If there are no constraints on 
discretion, the court-imposed sentence is fifteen years and the incarceration 
length is five years. If only constraints on parole are enacted, both the 
court-imposed sentence and the incarceration length are fifteen years. If 
only sentencing guidelines of, say, ten to twelve years are enacted, the 
court imposes a sentence of ten years, but the parole board still releases 
inmates in five years. Both sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole 
are necessary to achieve the legislature’s preferences. If both constraints 
are enacted, judges impose ten-year sentences, and the court-imposed 
sentence cannot be undermined by parole boards.  
Thus, our model predicts that legislatures have the incentive to enact 
both constraints on parole and sentencing guidelines when parole boards 
are lenient and undermine court-imposed sentences and when judges have 
preferences that are too extreme relative to the legislature.  
5.  Summarizing the Model 
We can summarize the predictions of our model as follows: 
1. Legislatures have no incentive to constrain either parole 
boards or judges if the legislatures’ preferences equal the 
preferences of the actor that controls incarceration 
lengths.  
 
2. Legislatures have an incentive to enact constraints on 
parole when parole boards’ preferences are more lenient 
than the legislatures’ preferences.  
 
3. Legislatures have an incentive to enact only sentencing 
guidelines when either the judiciary is more lenient or 
more severe than the legislature, but the guidelines only 
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affect incarceration lengths if the parole board has severe 
preferences over sentencing.  
 
4. Legislatures have an incentive to enact both sentencing 
guidelines and constraints on parole when the parole board 
is lenient and judges’ preferences conflict with the 
legislatures preferences, regardless of whether they are too 
lenient or too severe.  
These predictions from our political economy model depend on the 
preferences of the various actors over sentencing, but these preferences are 
not directly observable in reality. However, we can translate these 
theoretical predictions into testable hypotheses by making a 
straightforward general assumption. Namely, we assume that the political 
affiliations of the actors are good proxies for their sentencing preferences. 
That is, we assume that actors affiliated with the Republican Party tend to 
have more severe preferences over sentences, whereas actors affiliated with 
the Democratic Party tend to have more lenient preferences. Admittedly, 
this assumption will not be accurate for all judges. However, as long as this 
assumption is an accurate generalization—on average, Republicans have 
more severe preferences than Democrats—it suffices for forming testable 
predictions.82 
Using this assumption, our model produces the following testable 
hypothesis: 
1. When legislatures, judges, and parole boards are affiliated 
with the same political party and have similar sentencing 
goals, then the legislature has little incentive to enact 
either sentencing guidelines or constraints on parole. 
 
2. The legislature has an incentive to enact constraints on 
parole when the parole board is too lenient, or in other 
words, when the parole board is affiliated with the 
Democratic Party and the legislature is affiliated with the 
Republican Party. 
 
3. The legislature has an incentive to enact sentencing 
guidelines when judges’ sentencing goals conflict with the 
legislature’s goals, or in other words, when judges are 
from a different political party than the legislature—either 
Republican or Democrat. 
                                                                                                                     
 82. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that this assumption is an accurate generalization. 
See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623 (2009) 
(arguing that judges who must be reelected by Republican voters tended to rule in accordance with 
Republican policy, such as against defendants in criminal appeals, whereas judges facing re-election 
from Democratic voters were judiciously more liberal). 
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In the next Part, our empirical analysis estimates the influences of 
several public interest concerns and political economy concerns on 
legislatures’ decisions to enact determinate sentencing reforms. For 
example, our empirical estimation includes proxies for incarceration costs 
and rising crime rates to measure the influence of these public interest 
concerns. Likewise, we include several variables that represent the 
predictions of our political economy model. For example, we include 
measures of divided government to determine whether divergent 
preferences between the legislature, judiciary, and parole board influence 
legislatures’ enactment of determinate sentencing reforms. We also 
consider whether legislatures are more likely to enact sentencing guidelines 
to constrain elected judges, who may have preferences that are more likely 
to diverge from the legislature’s than those of appointed judges.  
IV.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: INFLUENCES ON THE ENACTMENT OF 
DETERMINATE SENTENCING REFORMS  
We perform several analyses that measure the influence of both public 
interest concerns and political economy concerns on the enactment of 
sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing legislation, and abolishment of 
discretionary parole. We first describe the public interest and political 
economy variables used in our analyses. Then, we present the basic data to 
see if general trends emerge among states that have and have not enacted 
determinate sentencing reforms. Next, we perform more sophisticated 
analyses in order to isolate the influence of political economy variables and 
public interest variables on legislatures’ decisions to enact reforms. We 
discuss both the empirical methodology and the results from these more 
sophisticated techniques. 
A.  Political Economy and Public Interest Variables 
Our analyses include several variables that represent either the political 
economy concerns or public interest concerns of state legislatures. The 
political economy variables directly test the predictions of our political 
economy model; they measure the degree of political divisiveness and 
tension among the sentencing goals of legislatures, judges, and parole 
boards. Likewise, we employ specific public interest variables to test 
whether the purported social goals of determinate sentencing—reducing 
crime and controlling correctional budgets—are consistent with the actual 
data.  
1.  Political Economy Concerns 
Our political economy variables fall into two general categories: 
divided government variables and variables that reflect the need for 
legislative oversight of judges and parole boards. 
First, we include variables that represent the political divergence among 
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state legislatures, judges, and parole boards. When a state’s legislature, 
parole board, and judges have different political affiliations, a conflict 
among sentencing goals is more likely. In our analysis, the majority party 
of the legislature represents the political preferences of the legislature. 
Unfortunately, the political preferences of the parole board and state judges 
are typically unknown. However, we proxy these preferences with the 
political party of the governor in each state. Because governors appoint the 
parole board in each state, the political preferences of the governor will 
typically be consistent with the preferences of parole board members.83 
Moreover, in 24.3% of jurisdictions, trial court judges initially are 
appointed either directly by the governor or by a judicial nominating 
commission with many members appointed by the governor and with the 
governor making either the nominating decisions or final appointment 
decisions.84 In addition, 43.2% of trial court judges are initially elected 
through partisan elections where receiving a party’s nomination can be 
critical to a candidate’s victory.85 Thus, political party leaders effectively 
chose many of the states’ trial court judges.  
Thus, when a state’s governor and legislature have different political 
affiliations, there is more likely to be conflict among the sentencing goals 
of legislatures, parole boards, and judges. Moreover, we measure the 
history of political divisiveness between the governor and state legislature 
instead of the current political divisiveness. Because many judges have 
long, fixed terms and low turnover rates due to automatic reappointments 
or uncontested re-elections,86 the history of political divisiveness is more 
relevant than the current state of political divisiveness. Thus, a long history 
of divided government may produce clashes among the sentencing goals of 
legislatures and the governor-appointed parole boards and judges. 
Legislatures may try to reduce the tension by enacting determinate 
sentencing reforms that constrain the parole boards and judges.  
We include two different measures of the history of political 
divisiveness between the executive and legislative branches of each state: 
                                                                                                                     
 83. In most states, parole boards are executive branch agencies. See JOAN PETERSILIA, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHEN PRISONERS RETURN TO THE COMMUNITY: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 6 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184253.pdf (“In 
most States, the chair and all members of the parole board are appointed by the Governor.”); Eric C. 
Tung, Comment, Does the Prior Conviction Exception Apply to a Criminal Defendant’s Supervised 
Release Status?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1323, 1323 n.1 (2009) (noting that state governors typically 
appoint state parole boards).  
 84. AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT NO. 2 OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 299 (1998).  
 85. Id. See also Steven Zeidman, Judicial Politics: Making the Case for Merit Selection, 68 
ALB. L. REV. 713, 718 (2005) (explaining how a party’s nomination in New York judicial elections 
is “tantamount to victory”). 
 86. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 369 (1980). 
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the number of years since 1960 with Republican governors when the 
current legislature has a Democratic majority and the number of years since 
1960 with Democratic governors when the current legislature has a 
Republican majority. We separate the political divisiveness variable by 
party affiliation because we expect that the majority party of the legislature 
may be relevant to the decision to enact determinate sentencing reforms. 
Although there is generally bipartisan support for sentencing guidelines, 
truth-in-sentencing laws, and abolition of discretionary parole, most of the 
reforms have been motivated by concerns over rising crime rates. Because 
the crime-fighting purpose of the guidelines more closely aligns with the 
Republican platform, we expect that Republican legislatures are more 
likely to enact these reforms. Moreover, our political economy model 
predicts that Republican legislatures will have a stronger incentive to 
constrain Democratic parole boards with lenient sentencing preferences. 
We include other variables that measure the need for legislative control 
or oversight over judges’ and parole boards’ decisions. Various 
institutional factors may affect the amount of discretion judges and parole 
boards have, and the amount of oversight needed if legislatures’ sentencing 
goals conflict with these other actors’ goals.  
First, we include a variable that represents whether judges face partisan 
or nonpartisan re-elections. Judges that face re-election by the voters will 
likely have more extreme preferences than judges that face reappointment 
by another government official. Judges that face future gubernatorial or 
legislative reappointment tend to vote more moderately than elected judges 
for two reasons. First, because appointed judges can never be certain of the 
politics of the government branch that will be responsible for their future 
retention, they have the incentive to vote moderately in order to appeal to 
politicians from either political party.87 Second, governors and legislatures 
also tend to appoint moderate judges in order to increase the likelihood that 
future governors and legislatures of either party will reappoint the judges 
they originally selected.88  
In contrast, elected judges have very different incentives. As ideological 
changes in voters do not occur as suddenly as the executive or legislative 
branches can change power, elected judges do not face the same incentives 
to vote moderately in order to appeal to future politicians from either 
party.89 In contrast, elected judges need to appeal to a small subset of 
citizens; voter turnout for judicial elections has historically been extremely 
low with often less than 20% of eligible voters turning out to vote in 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Politics of Judicial Opposition, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 88, 92 (2010). 
 88. Id. at 92 n.3 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary 
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975)). 
 89. Shepherd, supra note 87. 
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judicial elections.90 Moreover, the voters who actually do turn out may 
have relatively extreme preferences; their extreme preferences may be their 
motivation for voting.  
We also include an indicator variable to represent whether criminal 
sentencing decisions are made by judges or juries. In a majority of states, 
judges impose criminal sentences after both jury and bench trials. 
However, in six states—Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, 
and Virginia—juries select sentences after non-capital jury trials.91 The 
actors making the sentencing decisions may be relevant to legislatures’ 
decisions to enact determinate sentencing reforms. Conflicting sentencing 
goals between judges and legislatures may be less relevant in states that 
allow juries to impose many criminal sentences. Alternatively, legislatures 
may feel that sentencing guidelines are more critical to constrain 
inexperienced juries than judges; evidence suggests that jury sentences are 
more varied than sentences imposed by judges.92 
Although judges’ retention methods and jury sentencing may be more 
relevant in the decision to constrain judges through sentencing guidelines, 
they could also be relevant in the decision to constrain parole boards. 
Parole boards are the last movers in the sentencing process because their 
decisions are reactions to the court-imposed sentence. Thus, the 
preferences of the judges or juries making sentencing decisions should 
affect the parole boards’ reactions to those sentences.  
2.  Public Interest Concerns 
Next, we include several variables that represent legislatures’ public 
interest concerns that may influence their decisions to enact determinate 
sentencing reforms. First, we include variables that reflect legislatures’ 
concerns over high or rising crime rates. Determinate sentencing reforms 
were enacted, in part, to eliminate the lenient and uncertain sentences that 
resulted from indeterminate sentencing.93 Indeed, one of the purported 
goals of sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing legislation, and 
abolition of discretionary parole was to increase imprisonment for criminal 
offenders.  
Thus, we include two variables that reflect legislatures’ concerns for 
fighting crime. We include each state’s annual violent crime rates to 
                                                                                                                     
 90. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 52–53 
(2003). 
 91. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State 
Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004). 
 92. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: 
Comparing Severity and Variance with Judicial Sentences in Two States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 331, 331–32 (2005) (analyzing two of the six states—Arkansas and Virginia—with jury 
sentencing systems in non-capital cases). 
 93. Tonry, supra note 15, at 1247. 
2010] LEGISLATURES, JUDGES, AND PAROLE BOARDS 1067 
 
capture the influence of crime rates on legislatures’ decisions, and we 
include each state’s annual police per 100,000-person population (per 
capita) to capture the states’ existing crime-control priorities.94 
Legislatures may also be motivated by concerns of rising correctional 
budgets. Indeed, some legislatures that enacted sentencing guidelines were 
influenced by the desire to control the fiscal burdens of imprisonment.95 
Thus, we include prisoners per 100,000-person population (per capita) to 
determine whether prison capacity and correctional costs were important 
factors in states’ decisions to enact guidelines.  
We also include measures of the general political preferences of each 
state’s citizens. The people elect legislatures to represent the will of the 
people. Thus, legislatures’ decisions to enact determinate sentencing 
reforms may reflect the wishes of the constituents more than the desires of 
the legislators themselves. We include the Berry et al. measure of citizen 
ideology to capture the general preferences of each state’s citizens.96 We 
also include the Berry et al. measure of government ideology that measures 
the ideology of the elected public officials in a state, which should 
correspond to the ideological preferences of the voting citizens that elect 
these officials.97 Both of these variables are well-known and frequently 
used measures of ideology. They are computed from data on the interest 
group ratings of the members of Congress, election returns for 
congressional races, the party composition of state legislatures, and the 
party affiliation of state governors.  
B.  The Basic Data 
Our data set consists of 2,050 observations, one for each state for the 
period 1960 to 2000. Thus, each observation represents a state in a given 
year. The appendix presents an overview of the data, including each 
variable’s sample mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum 
                                                                                                                     
 94. We lag all variables by one year because contemporaneous variables and sentencing 
reforms may exhibit reverse causality, where statutory changes may influence the variables. 
Evidence on the potential reverse causality between violent crime and truth-in-sentencing laws can 
be found in Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: The 
Truth about Truth-in-Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & ECON. 509 (2002) (noting, for instance, how 
truth-in-sentencing laws may result in violent crime offenders switching from violent crimes to 
property crimes that are not covered by the laws). Evidence on the potential reverse causality 
between violent crime and sentencing guidelines can be found in Shepherd, supra note 14, at 535 
(noting how sentencing guidelines resulted in increases in crime).  
 95. The original stated purposes of the guidelines in Delaware, Minnesota, North Carolina, 
and Washington was to control resources. NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 10, 17, 19, 26 (2008). 
 96. William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American 
States, 1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327 (1998) (espousing on the authors’ development of 
dynamic measures of the ideology of a state’s citizens and politicians). 
 97. Id. 
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values. It also includes a detailed description of the sources of the data. 
Figures 2 through 7 present the general trends in the data. The figures 
compare the average value of each variable among the states with 
sentencing guidelines, the states with either truth-in-sentencing laws 
(abbreviated “TIS” in the figures) or abolition of discretionary parole, the 
states with both reforms, and the states with neither reform. Figure 2 
presents the data for the political divisiveness variables. It demonstrates 
that states with neither sentencing guidelines nor constraints on parole have 
a significantly lower incidence of divided government. This trend is 
consistent with the predictions of our model—states with less political 
divisiveness will have less tension among the sentencing goals of 
legislatures, judges, and parole boards, and in turn, legislatures will be less 
likely to enact reforms that constrain the sentencing discretion of these 
other actors. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that states with Democratic 
legislatures and divided government are more likely to enact sentencing 
guidelines than constraints on parole, whereas states with Republican 
legislatures and divided government are more likely to enact constraints on 
parole than sentencing guidelines.  
 
Figure 2 
General Trends in Divided Government Measures 
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Figure 3 presents the trends in the judicial institutional variables. These 
institutional factors may affect the amount of discretion judges and parole 
boards have and the amount of oversight needed if legislatures’ sentencing 
goals conflict with these other actors’ goals. Figure 3 demonstrates that in 
states where judges face re-election, sentencing guidelines are more likely 
to be implemented than constraints on parole. A similar trend is visible in 
states where juries impose criminal sentences. These results are consistent 
with states enacting guidelines that restrict court-imposed sentences in 
order to control the extreme preferences of elected judges and juries. In 
contrast, constraints on parole are the least as likely in these states. This 
suggests that states may prefer to maintain the parole boards’ discretion 
with incarceration lengths when judges and juries have more extreme 
preferences. 
 
Figure 3 
General Trends in Judicial Institutional Variables 
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Figure 4 reveals the general trends in violent crime rates. The figure 
reveals that there is a large difference in violent crime rates among states 
with and without determinate sentencing reforms. Thus, the basic data is 
consistent with the purported crime-control goals of both sentencing 
guidelines and constraints on parole; states are more likely to enact reforms 
when crime rates are high.  
 
Figure 4 
General Trends in Crime  
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Figure 5 reveals the general trends in prisoners per capita. The data 
reveal that both sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole are more 
likely in states with high imprisonment rates. This is consistent with states 
hoping to control correctional costs through determinate sentencing 
reforms; the reforms are more likely in states with high imprisonment 
rates, and, in turn, high correctional costs.  
 
Figure 5 
General Trends in Prisoners 
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 Figure 6 presents the basic data on police per capita. This figure shows 
that determinate sentencing reforms are more likely in states with more 
police. This trend is also consistent with the crime-control goals of 
determinate sentencing reforms; states that are concerned with crime rates 
tend to hire many police. Moreover, the basic data also suggest that 
sentencing reforms and police hiring are not considered to be substitute 
crime-control policies.  
 
Figure 6 
General Trends in Police 
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Finally, Figure 7 presents the general trends in the Berry et al. measures 
of citizen and government ideology. Higher values of these ideology 
measures indicate more conservative preferences. Thus, Figure 7, showing 
the average Berry et al. score of each category, demonstrates that states 
with more conservative citizens and governments are more likely to enact 
determinate sentencing reforms. These trends are consistent with 
legislatures striving to represent the will of the people. 
 
Figure 7 
Raw Data on Ideological Variables 
 
C.  Econometric Analysis 
 
Although the basic data reveal general trends among states that have 
and have not enacted determinate sentencing reforms, we perform more 
sophisticated analyses in order to isolate the influences of political 
economy variables and public interest variables on legislatures’ decisions 
to enact reforms. After discussing our econometric methodology, we 
present the results from several different estimations.  
1.  Methodology 
Our econometric analyses measure the relationship between the 
enactment of determinate sentencing reforms and several variables that 
represent either legislatures’ public interest concerns or political economy 
concerns. Our general estimation model is: 
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Prob(Reform=1|x) = φ (β0 + β1*Political Economy Concerns + 
β2*Public Interest Concerns) 
In each set of estimations, we specify Reform in three different ways. In 
the first specification, the dependent variable, Reform, is the presence of 
sentencing guidelines in a state. In the second specification, Reform is 
either the abolition of parole or the presence of truth-in-sentencing laws in 
a state. Finally, in the third specification, Reform is the presence of both 
sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole boards. 
We estimate both logit models and semiparametric duration models to 
ensure that our empirical findings are robust to different estimation 
techniques. Our first set of estimations analyzes states’ decisions to enact 
and maintain determinate sentencing reforms. Thus, our three outcome 
variables are 1) the decision to adopt and maintain sentencing guidelines; 
2) the decision to adopt and maintain either truth-in-sentencing legislation 
or abolition of discretionary parole; and 3) the decision to adopt and 
maintain both sentencing guidelines and constraints on discretionary 
parole. We model these decisions as a dichotomous choice; each decision 
to enact and maintain a reform is a positive outcome and each failure to 
enact or maintain a reform is a null outcome. By coding as positive 
outcomes both the year of enactment and the years after enactment that 
states continue to uphold reforms, this estimation recognizes that both 
political economy and public interest concerns are important, not only in 
enacting but also in maintaining these sentencing reforms over time. Given 
the dichotomous nature of the outcomes, we estimate this model with a 
maximum likelihood logit model.98  
Next, we analyze a slightly different question—what influences states’ 
decisions to enact determinate sentencing reforms. Thus, in the second set 
of estimations, we ignore influences on the decision to continue to uphold 
reforms in the years after enactment. Thus, our three outcome variables 
are: 1) the decision to adopt sentencing guidelines; 2) the decision to adopt 
either truth-in-sentencing legislation or abolition of discretionary parole; 
and 3) the decision to adopt both sentencing guidelines and constraints on 
discretionary parole. By coding only the year of enactment as a positive 
outcome (and coding subsequent years as a null outcome), this estimation 
controls for the fact that it may simply be inertia, and not political economy 
or public interest factors, that keeps these reforms in place. As these 
outcomes are still dichotomous, our second set of estimations also employs 
a maximum likelihood logit model. 
For our third set of estimations, we employ a semiparametric duration 
model. Like our second set of logit estimations, duration models also test 
for influences on the decision to enact reforms, rather than on the decision 
                                                                                                                     
 98. For a general discussion of the logit model, see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC 
ANALYSIS 846 (4th ed. 2000).  
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to both enact and maintain reforms. However, whereas the second set of 
logit estimations measures the factors that influence legislatures to enact 
reforms in a given year, the duration models are concerned with the length 
of time that elapses before a state enacts this type of legislation. Thus, the 
duration model estimations will reveal what factors influence the timing of 
enactment—whether states adopt reforms early, late, or never at all.  
Moreover, we employ a semiparametric duration model—the Cox 
proportional hazards regression model. 99 Semiparametric models are 
superior to parametric models because they do not require assumptions 
about the distribution of failure times that could produce inconsistent 
estimation of covariate coefficients if the baseline hazard is 
misspecified.100 Cox’s model exploits the fact that, with survival data, 
events that occur at certain times may be ordered so that estimates can be 
obtained by pooling over the risk groups based on ordered survival 
times.101 A partial likelihood calculation estimates the model.  
2.  Empirical Results 
The results support the hypothesis that both political economy and 
public interest concerns influence legislatures’ decisions to enact 
determinate sentencing reforms. Tables 4, 5, and 6 report the results from 
our estimations. The tables indicate the relationship between each variable 
and the legislatures’ enactment and, in some regressions, maintenance of 
each reform. In each table, the top number in each cell is the regression 
coefficient, which indicates the magnitude and direction of each variable’s 
relationship with legislatures’ decisions. A negative coefficient indicates 
that a variable reduces the likelihood that a legislature will enact a reform. 
In contrast, a positive coefficient indicates that a variable increases the 
likelihood of enactment or maintenance of the reforms.  
In addition, each table reports the t-statistic for each coefficient. In each 
cell, the t-statistic is the bottom number, in parentheses. Coefficients with 
t-statistics equal to or greater than 1.645 are considered statistically 
significant at the 10% level, meaning that there is 90% certainty that the 
coefficient is different from zero. T-statistics equal to or greater than 1.96 
indicate statistical significance at the more-certain 5% level, and t-statistics 
equal to or greater than 2.576 indicate statistical significance at the most-
                                                                                                                     
 99. See D. R. Cox, Regression Models and Life-Tables, 34 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 187 (1972).  
100. See Bruce D. Meyer, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, 58 
ECONOMETRICA 757, 769 (1990). Although these models are nonparametric because they make no 
assumptions about the distribution of time to failure, there remains a parametric component because 
we are still parameterizing the effect of the covariates. See MARIO CLEVES ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION 
TO SURVIVAL ANALYSIS USING STATA 5 (2004). Thus, they are referred to as semiparametric. Id. 
101. Essentially, a separate analysis on the probability of failure is performed at each failure 
time, and then these analyses are combined. CLEVES ET AL., supra note 100, at 3. Because each of 
the separate analyses made no assumption about the distribution of failure times, the combined 
analysis also makes no assumption. Id. at 4.  
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certain 1% level. Empiricists typically require t-statistics of at least 1.645 
to conclude that one variable affects another in the direction indicated by 
the coefficient.102 In the table, “*”, “+”, and “ª” indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
a.  Legislatures’ Decisions to Enact and Maintain Determinate 
Sentencing Reforms 
Table 4 reports the results from our logit estimations that analyze states’ 
decisions to both enact and maintain determinate sentencing reforms. The 
results show that several political economy concerns and public interest 
concerns are associated with all three outcome variables: the enactment 
and maintenance of sentencing guidelines alone, the enactment and 
maintenance of either truth-in-sentencing legislation or abolition of 
discretionary parole alone, and the enactment and maintenance of both 
sentencing guidelines and constraints on discretionary parole.103 
 
Table 4 
Logit Estimation Results: Influences on the Enactment and Maintenance 
of Determinate Sentencing Reforms 
 
 
Sentencing 
Guidelines 
Truth-in-
Sentencing 
Legislation 
and/or Abolition 
of Discretionary 
Parole 
Both Sentencing 
Guidelines and 
Truth-in-
Sentencing 
Legislation and/or 
Abolition of 
Discretionary 
Parole 
Political Economy 
Variables:    
For Current 
Democratic 
Legislature: Years 
since 0.04* 0.03+ 0.04* 
                                                                                                                     
 102.  For each regression, the table also reports the pseudo R-squared statistic. In contrast to t-
statistics, which measure the reliability of each individual coefficient, R-squared statistics measure 
the regression’s overall goodness-of-fit. GREENE, supra note 98, at 236–38. The statistics range 
from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating better goodness-of-fit. While the R-squared statistic 
indicates goodness-of-fit in an OLS regression, the pseudo R-squared statistic measures goodness-
of-fit in a logistic regression. UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group. 
FAQ: What are pseudo R-squareds?, available at http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/gen  
eral/Psuedo_RSquareds.htm (last visited June 20, 2010). 
103. The table reports the results from logit regressions on the decision to enact and maintain 
each reform. In each cell, the top number is the coefficient estimate and the bottom number is the t-
statistic computed from robust standard errors. “*”, “+”, and “ª” represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Sentencing 
Guidelines 
Truth-in-
Sentencing 
Legislation 
and/or Abolition 
of Discretionary 
Parole 
Both Sentencing 
Guidelines and 
Truth-in-
Sentencing 
Legislation and/or 
Abolition of 
Discretionary 
Parole 
1960 with Republican 
Governor (3.09) (2.37) (3.57) 
For Current 
Republican 
Legislature: Years 
since 0.08* 0.05* 0.05* 
1960 with Democratic 
Governor (6.89) (5.43) (5.03) 
Judges face Re-
election 1.10* -.374+ -.222 
 
(6.16) (2.49) (1.61) 
Jury Sentencing 0.21 -1.61* -1.74* 
 
(0.82) (4.37) (3.10) 
Public Interest 
Variables:    
Violent Crime rate 0.002* 0.0009* 0.002* 
 (7.23) (2.98) (6.72) 
Prisoners 100,000 pop. 3.38* 3.01* 3.19* 
 (6.54) (5.36) (6.31) 
Police 100,000 pop. -7.42 -8.84ª -13.42+ 
 (1.22) (1.73) (2.48) 
Berry Citizen Ideology 0.034* 0.026* 0.025* 
 
(5.15) (4.89) (4.99) 
    
Berry Govt Ideology 0.009ª -0.006 -0.002 
 (1.92) (1.61) (0.07) 
Number of 
Observations 1982 1982 1982 
Pseudo R-squared .2012 .1196 .1605 
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The results reveal that both measures of divided government have a 
positive influence on legislatures’ decisions to enact determinate 
sentencing reforms. These results are consistent with our model’s 
hypothesis that long histories of split parties produce clashes among the 
sentencing goals of legislatures, parole boards, and judges. Our results 
suggest that legislatures may try to reduce the tension by enacting 
determinate sentencing reforms that constrain the parole boards and judges.  
The coefficients are larger in magnitude for the divided government 
variable with a majority Republican legislature than for the divided 
government variable with a majority Democratic legislature. This indicates 
that, consistent with the crime-control goals of these reforms, Republicans 
are more likely than Democrats to enact and maintain these reforms. This 
result is also consistent with the predictions of our political economy 
model: Republican legislatures have stronger incentives to restrain 
Democratic parole boards with more lenient sentencing preferences. 
Although the coefficients in the table give the effect of each variable on 
the log odds of enactment and maintenance of each reform, we can 
interpret the coefficients using predicted probabilities.104 For example, the 
coefficients reveal that the baseline probability of enacting and maintaining 
sentencing guidelines in any particular year is only 5%. However, when the 
legislature is currently majority Democrat while previously there have been 
at least twenty years with Republican governors, the probability of enacting 
and maintaining sentencing guidelines increases to 12.6%. Likewise, when 
the legislature is currently majority Republican but there have been at least 
twenty years with Democratic governors, this probability increases to 
23.2%. Similarly, the baseline probability of enacting and maintaining 
either truth-in-sentencing laws or abolition of discretionary parole is 9%. 
However, the probability increases to 17.5% when there is a Democratic 
majority in the legislature but there have been at least twenty years with 
Republican governors, and the probability increases to 24.5% when there is 
a Republican majority in the legislature but there have been at least twenty 
years with Democratic governors. 
The results also indicate that legislatures are more likely to enact and 
maintain sentencing guidelines when judges face re-election by the voters. 
This result is consistent with our prediction that legislatures are more likely 
to constrain judges’ decisions when the judges have more extreme 
preferences than the legislatures.  
However, legislatures are less likely to enact and maintain constraints 
on parole when judges face re-election. These results suggest that 
legislatures want to maintain the parole boards’ discretion over 
incarceration lengths when judges have more extreme preferences. 
                                                                                                                     
104. For a discussion of how to transform logit coefficients into predicted probabilities, see 
ACADEMIC TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, UCLA, STATA DATA ANALYSIS EXAMPLES: LOGIT REGRESSION, 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/dae/logit.htm (last visited May 10, 2010). 
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Similarly, legislatures are less likely to enact and maintain constraints on 
parole when criminal sentencing decisions are made by juries. This result 
suggests that legislatures want to maintain the parole boards’ discretion 
over incarceration lengths when inexperienced juries impose criminal 
sentences. 
Thus, consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, several 
political economy concerns appear to influence legislatures’ decisions to 
enact and maintain determinate sentencing reforms. The legislatures are 
more likely to enact reforms when there is tension between the sentencing 
goals of legislatures, parole boards, and judges—either because there is a 
history of divided government or because elected judges have more 
extreme preferences. Moreover, legislatures tend to not enact constraints 
on parole, preserving the parole boards’ discretion, when court-imposed 
sentences tend to be more extreme—either because judges face re-election 
or because criminal sentencing decisions are made by juries. 
In addition, public interest concerns also influence legislatures’ 
decisions to enact and maintain determinate sentencing reforms. The table 
indicates that legislatures are more likely to enact and maintain both 
sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole when violent crime rates 
are high. This suggests that legislatures’ concerns over high crime rates 
motivated them to pass and maintain determinate sentencing reforms.  
Both sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole are also more 
likely when there are large numbers of prisoners. This result is consistent 
with legislatures’ tough-on-crime mentality; states with high crime rates 
tend to have more prisoners, and thus, legislatures are motivated to enact 
reforms aimed at fighting crime. However, this result also suggests that 
legislatures are not influenced by concerns over rising correctional budgets. 
They tend to enact reforms that will increase imprisonment when prison 
capacity and, in turn, correctional costs are already high. 
Moreover, the results suggest that legislatures are less likely to enact 
and maintain both sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole when 
their states have a high proportion of police per capita. These results 
indicate that when states have already taken measures to control crime by 
hiring more police, they are less likely to enact reforms that will increase 
incarceration lengths, possibly because these reforms serve as substitute 
mechanisms for achieving deterrence. 
Finally, legislatures are more likely to enact and maintain both 
sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole when the states’ citizens 
are more conservative. This result suggests that legislatures are striving to 
represent the wishes of their constituents by enacting tough-on-crime 
reforms. 
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b.  Legislatures’ Decisions to Enact Determinate Sentencing 
Reforms 
Table 5 reports the results from our logit estimations that analyze states’ 
decisions to enact determinate sentencing reforms.105 Once again, the 
results show that both political economy concerns and public interest 
concerns influence legislatures’ decisions.106 
 
Table 5 
Logit Estimation Results:  
Influences on the Enactment of Determinate Sentencing Reforms 
 
Sentencing 
Guidelines 
Truth-in-
Sentencing 
Legislation and/or 
Abolition of 
Discretionary 
Parole 
Both Sentencing 
Guidelines and 
Truth-in-Sentencing 
Legislation and/or 
Abolition of 
Discretionary Parole 
Political Economy 
Variables: 
   
For Current Democratic 
Legislature: Years since 0.07+ 0.10+ 0.04* 
1960 with Republican 
Governor  
(2.17) (2.10) (1.98) 
For Current Republican 
Legislature: Years since 0.09+ 0.13+ 0.05* 
1960 with Democratic 
Governor  
(2.25) (2.51) (1.95) 
Judges Face Re-election  0.85ª -.13 0.48 
 
(1.66) (0.24) (1.21) 
Jury Sentencing  0.51 0.06 0.14 
 
(0.78) (0.32) (0.26) 
Public Interest 
Variables: 
   
                                                                                                                     
105. In 1994, the federal government passed the 1994 Crime Act, which awarded grants to 
states that enacted truth-in-sentencing legislation. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 20102, 20103, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). In order to separate the influence of the 
federal legislation from the political economy and public interest variables, we limited our time 
period to pre-1994 in the estimations when the outcome variable is the decision to adopt either 
truth-in-sentencing legislation or abolition of discretionary parole. 
106. The table reports the results from logit regressions on the decision to enact each reform. 
In each cell, the top number is the coefficient estimate and the bottom number is the t-statistic 
computed from robust standard errors. “*”, “+”, and “ª” represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Sentencing 
Guidelines 
Truth-in-
Sentencing 
Legislation and/or 
Abolition of 
Discretionary 
Parole 
Both Sentencing 
Guidelines and 
Truth-in-Sentencing 
Legislation and/or 
Abolition of 
Discretionary Parole 
Violent Crime Rate  0.002* 0.0003* 0.002* 
 
(2.77) (2.25) (4.10) 
Prisoners 100,000 pop. -0.007 4.02 0.022 
 (0.29) (1.03) (0.03) 
Police 100,000 pop. 11.42 20.42 8.37 
 
(0.52) (1.08) (0.6) 
Berry Citizen Ideology 0.007 0.012 0.001 
 
(0.34) (0.42) (0.09) 
Berry Govt. Ideology 0.019 -0.025 -0.004 
 
(1.16) (1.15) (0.30) 
Number of Observations 1982 1395 1982 
Pseudo R-squared .0862 .0964 .0637 
 
The table reports the results from logit estimations when only the year 
of enactment is coded as a positive outcome (subsequent years are coded as 
a null outcome). Thus, these estimations ignore the influences of political 
economy and public interest variables on legislatures’ decisions to uphold 
reforms after enactment.  
Nevertheless, the table reveals that the divided government variables 
continue to have a statistically significant relationship with legislatures’ 
decisions to enact sentencing guidelines alone, constraints on parole alone, 
and both reforms together. This indicates that not only is divided 
government important to maintaining determinate sentencing reforms, but 
it is also important to the initial enactment decisions. Once again, these 
results confirm the predictions of our model: Long histories of divided 
government produce clashes among the sentencing goals of legislatures, 
parole boards, and judges, and legislatures respond by attempting to restrict 
the discretion of the other actors. 
Moreover, the coefficients continue to be larger in magnitude for the 
divided government variable with a majority Republican legislature than 
for the divided government variable with a majority Democratic 
legislature. This result suggests that Republican legislatures’ tough-on-
crime agenda was an important influence on their decision to enact these 
reforms. It is also consistent with the predictions of our political economy 
model: Republican legislatures have a stronger incentive to constrain 
Democratic parole boards with more lenient sentencing preferences. 
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The only public interest variable that has a statistically significant 
relationship with legislatures’ decisions is the violent crime rate. The table 
reveals that the higher the violent crime rate, the more likely legislatures 
are to enact sentencing guidelines alone, constraints on parole alone, and 
both reforms together. Once again, this confirms that legislatures’ concerns 
over high crime rates influenced their decisions to enact these determinate 
sentencing reforms. The statistical insignificance of the other public 
interest variables suggests that, although these other variables were 
relevant to the decision to maintain determinate sentencing reforms, they 
are less important to the initial decision to enact these reforms.  
Table 6 reports the results from our Cox proportional hazards 
regression model. Like the previous logit model, this duration model 
analyzes states’ decisions to enact, not maintain, determinate sentencing 
reforms.107 The table reveals that the only significant variables are the 
divided government variables. Again, this confirms the hypothesis from 
our political economy model: Legislatures are more likely to enact 
determinate sentencing reforms when their sentencing goals differ from the 
goals of the judges and parole boards. 
 
Table 6 
Duration Model Results:  
Influences on the Enactment of Determinate Sentencing Reforms 
 
Sentencing 
Guidelines 
Truth-in-
Sentencing 
Legislation and/or 
Abolition of 
Discretionary 
Parole 
Both Sentencing 
Guidelines and Truth-
in-Sentencing 
Legislation and/or 
Abolition of 
Discretionary Parole 
Political Economy Variables: 
   
For Current Democratic 
Legislature: Years since 0.06ª 0.07ª 0.03 
1960 with Republican 
Governor  
(1.71) (1.83) (0.79) 
For Current Republican 
Legislature: Years since 0.08+ 0.11* 0.08+ 
1960 with Democratic 
Governor  
(2.02) (2.57) (2.01) 
Judges Face Re-election  0.67 -.15 -0.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
107. In 1994, the federal government passed the 1994 Crime Act, which awarded grants to 
states that enacted truth-in-sentencing legislation. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). In 
order to separate the influence of the federal legislation from the political economy and public 
interest variables, we limited our time period to pre-1994 in the estimations when the outcome 
variable is the decision to adopt either truth-in-sentencing legislation or abolition of discretionary 
parole. 
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Sentencing 
Guidelines 
Truth-in-
Sentencing 
Legislation and/or 
Abolition of 
Discretionary 
Parole 
Both Sentencing 
Guidelines and Truth-
in-Sentencing 
Legislation and/or 
Abolition of 
Discretionary Parole 
Jury Sentencing  0.08 -3.8 -1.29 
 (0.14) (0.532) (1.37) 
Public Interest Variables: 
   
Violent Crime Rate  0.0002 -0.0001 -0.00009 
  
(0.17) (.07) (0.07) 
Prisoners per 100,000 pop. 4.36 1.38 4.79 
 
(1.50) (0.29) (1.10) 
Police per 100,000 pop. -5.24 11.44 -9.18 
 
(0.18) (0.68) (0.56) 
Berry Citizen Ideology  0.014 0.037 0.013 
  (0.56) (0.99) (0.45) 
Berry Govt. Ideology 0.013 -0.051 -0.007 
 
(0.70) (1.55) (0.34) 
Number of Observations 1755 1444 1427 
Chi-Squared Test .2179 .0547 .3150 
 
c.  Discussion of Results 
The results from our empirical analyses strongly support the predictions 
of our political economy model. Regardless of the estimation technique, 
our measures of divided government have a strong positive relationship 
with legislatures’ enactment and maintenance of sentencing guidelines and 
constraints on parole. Long histories of divided government likely produce 
clashes among the sentencing goals of legislatures, parole boards, and 
judges. Our results suggest that legislatures respond to this tension by 
enacting determinate sentencing reforms that reallocate power away from 
judges and parole boards and towards the legislatures themselves. 
The results also consistently show that Republican legislatures with 
divided governments are more likely to enact determinate sentencing 
reforms than Democratic legislatures with divided governments. This 
result suggests that Republican legislatures’ tough-on-crime agenda was an 
important influence on the legislatures’ decisions to enact these reforms. It 
is also consistent with the predictions of our political economy model: 
Republican legislatures have a stronger incentive to constrain Democratic 
parole boards with more lenient sentencing preferences. 
The results are weaker for most of the other variables. Violent crime 
rates have a statistically significant relationship with determinate 
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sentencing reforms in the two logit estimations, but the results from the 
duration model are insignificant. The results for the other public interest 
variables, elected judges, and jury sentencing are only statistically 
significant in the initial logit estimations. 
The weak results for most of the public interest variables suggest that 
legislatures’ public interest concerns are not the primary determinants of 
determinate sentencing reforms, as is often claimed. Instead, legislatures 
appear to be primarily motivated by political economy concerns; namely, 
they tend to reallocate power away from judges and parole boards when 
those groups have political ideologies that conflict with the legislatures’ 
preferences. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The most significant development in criminal sentencing in recent 
decades has been the shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing. In 
this Article, we present the first study to explore the factors leading to this 
shift. We develop a political economy model that explains why legislatures 
acting in their own self-interest may be motivated to enact these laws. Our 
model predicts that determinate sentencing reforms are more likely to be 
enacted when there is tension among the political ideologies of 
legislatures, judges, and parole boards. 
Our empirical analyses confirm that political variables, such as divided 
government, are a significant influence on legislatures’ decisions to enact 
determinate sentencing reforms. These results are consistent with our 
model’s hypothesis: Long histories of divided government produce clashes 
among the sentencing goals of legislatures, parole boards, and judges, and 
legislatures respond by enacting reforms that take power away from the 
judges and parole boards.  
Explaining the factors that influence legislatures to enact determinate 
sentencing reforms is especially important given recent developments in 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in relation to determinate sentencing. 
Decisions in several recent cases threaten the future of sentencing 
guidelines. In addition, constraints on parole boards have recently come 
under attack as states target prison overcrowding and rising correctional 
expenditures.  
As states consider reforming their current guidelines or parole systems, 
it becomes more important for scholars, criminal law practitioners, and 
policymakers to understand the legislatures’ original motivations for 
enacting these reforms. Contrary to the claims of many legislatures, the 
reforms were not solely motivated by public interest concerns. Instead, 
legislatures appear to be primarily motivated by political economy 
concerns; namely, they tend to reallocate power away from judges and 
parole boards when those groups have political ideologies that conflict 
with the legislatures’ preferences.  
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In light of these recent and ongoing developments in criminal justice, 
these empirical findings have several important implications. Presumably, 
states will be less hesitant to alter their current sentencing practices if they 
understand that political concerns, rather than public interest concerns, 
were the primary influence on the original enactment of determinate 
sentencing reforms. This is especially true given recent studies that suggest 
that not only does determinate sentencing increase correctional budgets, 
but it may also increase crime.108  
In addition, our findings suggest that future state reforms in response to 
the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence in this area may depend on the 
constellation of preferences among state actors. For instance, states in 
which there is more agreement among the sentencing goals of legislatures, 
judges, and parole boards may be able to enact more far-reaching reforms 
that move away from determinate sentencing.  
Overall, an understanding of the forces determining the original 
enactment of these sentencing regimes can provide a valuable compass in 
the uncertain times that appear to lie ahead for states’ criminal justice 
systems. 
                                                                                                                     
108. Shepherd, supra note 14, at 533, 535. Shepherd, supra note 94, at 509. 
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APPENDIX  
 
A.  OVERVIEW OF THE DATA 
Our data contains observations from all fifty states from 1960 to 2000. 
The data are arranged in a spreadsheet consisting of 2,050 rows and 
numerous columns. Each row is an observation and reports data for each 
state in a given year. Each column includes data on an individual variable 
for that state-year. For example, row 1 in our sorted data would include 
information on each variable for Alabama in 1960. Table 7 provides an 
overview of each variable: 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Sentencing Guidelines 0.1194 0.324 0 1 
 
   
 
Truth-in-Sentencing Legislation or 
Discretionary Parole Abolished 0.1578 0.3646 0 1 
Both Sentencing Guidelines & 
Truth-in-Sentencing or  
Discretionary Parole Abolished .2036 .4027 0 1 
Political Economy Variables: 
   
 
For Current Democratic 
Legislature:Years 3.727 5.592 0 31 
since 1960 with Republican 
Governor  
   
 
For Current Republican 
Legislature:Years 3.034 6.716 0 43 
since 1960 with Democratic 
Governor     
 
Judges Face Re-election  0.38 0.485 0 1 
Jury Sentencing 0.12 0.325 0 1 
Public Interest Variables: 
   
 
Violent Crime Rate  370.38 243.11 9.5 1244.3 
Prisoners per 100,000 population 177.48 136.94 20.3 901 
Police per 100,000 population 22.5 12.4 6.9 211.5 
Berry Citizen Ideology  46.62 16.39 .9625 95.83 
Berry Government Ideology 48.34 23.93 0 99.39 
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B.  DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 
 
Sentencing Guidelines 
 
Data on the year of enactment of the state guidelines systems are from 
three sources: Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, 
Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 
1196 (2005); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING 28 tbl.3-5 (1996), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/strsent.pdf; and WILLIAM J. 
SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., THE INFLUENCES OF 
TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING 
PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS 11 tbl.1.5 (2002), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410470_FINALTISrpt.pdf. There 
were a few discrepancies between some of the sources, so we coded a state 
as having truth-in-sentencing laws if either of the sources reported that the 
state had enacted this legislation. 
 
Truth-in-Sentencing Legislation 
 
Data on the year of enactment of truth-in-sentencing laws are from four 
sources: THOMAS J. HAMMER & MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, 2001 WISCONSIN 
ACT 109: CRIMES AND THEIR PENALTIES 3 (2003), 
http://www.wisspd.org/html/forprac/TISpartII.pdf; WILLIAM J. SABOL ET 
AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING 
REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON 
POPULATIONS 5 (2002), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195163.pdf; WILLIAM J. SABOL 
ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-
SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES 
AND PRISON POPULATIONS 11 tbl.1.5 (2002), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410470_FINALTISrpt.pdf; and U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING: AVAILABILITY OF 
FEDERAL GRANTS INFLUENCED LAWS IN SOME STATES 6 fig.1 (1998), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98042.pdf. There were a 
few discrepancies between some of the sources, so we coded a state as 
having truth-in-sentencing laws if either of the sources reported that the 
state had enacted this legislation. 
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Parole Abolition 
 
Data on the year states abolished parole is from WILLIAM J. SABOL ET 
AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR, THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-
SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES 
AND PRISON POPULATIONS 11 tbl.1.5 (2002), http://www.urban.org/Uploa  
dedPDF/410470_FINALTISrpt.pdf. 
 
Governors’ Party Affiliation 
 
The data on political party affiliation of governors from 1960 to 2000 is 
from Archive of Political Leaders by B. Schemmel, http://www.rulers.org/ 
index.html (last visited May 10, 2010).  
 
State Legislature Party Composition 
 
The data on party composition in each state legislature following each 
two-year election cycle since 1960 was obtained via: E-mail from Tim 
Storey, Senior Fellow, National Conference of State Legislatures, to 
Joanna M. Shepherd, Associate Professor of Law, Emory University 
School of Law (Mar. 20, 2006) (on file with author).   
 
Judicial Selection 
 
Data on the method of judicial selection is from AM. BAR ASS’N, 
REPORT NO. 2 OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 299 (1998). 
 
Jury Sentencing 
 
Data on jury sentencing in non-capital cases is from Nancy J. King & 
Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State 
Study, 57 VAND. LAW REV. 885, 886 (2004). 
 
Crime Rates 
 
State-level violent crime rates for the period from 1960 to 2000 are 
available from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. These data can be 
accessed on-line at the Database search of the Bureau of Justice Statistic, 
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm 
(last visited May 10, 2010).  
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Police Employment 
 
Data on full-time state police employees are from the Uniform Crime 
Reports for the United States (1960–1992) and Crime in the United States 
(1993–2000) both published by the U.S. Department of Justice.  
 
Prison Population 
 
Data on prison populations are from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
National Prisoner Statistics data series, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm? 
ty=tp&tid=131 (last visited May 10, 2010). We are thankful to Lawrence 
Katz for sharing prison population data from 1960 to 1990. E-mail from 
Lawrence Katz, Professor of Economics, Harvard University, to Joanna M. 
Shepherd, Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law 
(May 11, 2005) (on file with author). 
 
Berry et al. Measures of Government and Citizen Ideology: 
 
Data on the Berry et al. measures of government and citizen ideology 
are available at: http://www.uky.edu/~rford/Home_files/page0005.htm. 
For a discussion of the measures, see William D. Berry et al., Measuring 
Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–93, 42 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 327 (1998). 
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